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ANTITRUST AND THE MARKETPLACE OF IDEAS
MAURICE E. STUCKE
ALLEN P. GRUNES*
The United States is in the midst of a merger wave that is transforming
media ownership. Disney's acquisition of CapCities/ABC, Viacom's
acquisition of CBS, and AOL's acquisition of Time Warner are among
the more visible examples, but there have been hundreds of other transactions both large and small. Media mergers have been a growing cause
for concern among scholars, members of Congress, and the public, and
have led to calls for heightened antitrust scrutiny and new legislation.
As media mergers continue to occur, an important question for the
antitrust agencies and the courts is how to evaluate their competitive
effects. Thus, for example, the U.S. Department of Justice in its recent
consent decrees involving radio mergers has focused on a given merger's
impact on advertising rates in a local geographic market. In contrast,
we believe that the antitrust analysis of a media merger should be
expanded to include its impact on the "marketplace of ideas." The
"marketplace of ideas," as we explore in this article, consists of competition among various news and entertainment sources. The concept is
based on the underlying belief that truth prevails in the widest possible
dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources.
Antitrust enforcers can elect to ignore the marketplace of ideas in their
analysis of media mergers and instead focus solely on a merger's impact
on price competition. We believe that this narrow approach to media
mergers is incorrect, or at least incomplete. If antitrust review continues
to focus on particular horizontal overlaps and competitive effects are
measured only in terms of advertising dollars or programming costs,
large-scale anticompetitive media mergers will likely escape enforcement action.
Federal Trade Commission Chairman Robert Pitofsky wrote, more
than twenty years ago, that excessive concentration of economic power
will breed antidemocratic political pressures.' Any antitrust policy that
* Attorneys, Antitrust Division, U.S. Department ofJustice. The views expressed herein
are the authors' own and do not purport to reflect those of the U.S. Department ofJustice.
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neglected such concerns would "be unresponsive to the will of Congress."2 After reviewing the legislative history, Chairman Pitofsky stated,
"[i]t is bad history, bad policy, and bad law to exclude certain political
values in interpreting the antitrust laws." 3 The marketplace of ideas not
only represents such a political value as expressed by Chairman Pitofsky,
but it is also, as we explore in this article, a form of nonprice economic competition.
Part I of this article begins with an overview of the marketplace of
ideas, its relevance to the current crop of media mergers, and the
approach under the Horizontal Merger Guidelines4 if the marketplace
of ideas is excluded from the antitrust analysis. Part II then examines
the support for the proposition that the antitrust analysis of a media
merger should be expanded to include the merger's impact on the
marketplace of ideas. We review the legislative histories of the Sherman
and Clayton Acts, and relevant case law-particularly the Supreme Court
decisions in Associated Press5 and Turner Broadcasting.6
While we believe that the antitrust agencies should consider the marketplace of ideas in their analyses, we recognize that legitimate concerns
exist about government intervention in the media. Part III explores some
of the pros and cons of evaluating a media merger's impact on the
marketplace of ideas. We recognize the complexities of any antitrust
analysis of the. marketplace of ideas, and its potential dangers to the
First Amendment.
In Part IV we consider whether the marketplace of ideas should be
the exclusive concern of the Federal Communications Commission
(FCC) and/or whether additional antitrust legislation is needed. Finally,
in Part V we offer several modest proposals as to how the concept of
the marketplace of ideas might be incorporated into the antitrust analysis. Our proposals, however, are meant as a starting point out of this
thicket, not a destination.

The authors invite any comments, which can be e-mailed to Maurice.Stucke@usdoj.gov
and Allen.Grunes@usdoj.gov.
Robert Pitofsky, The Political Content of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 1051 (1979).
2 Id. at 1052.

3 Id. at 1051.
1 U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission Horizontal Merger Guidelines (1992, revised 1997), reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13,104 [hereinafter
Horizontal Merger Guidelines].
5
Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
6 Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994) (Turner).
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I. BACKGROUND OF "MARKETPLACE OF IDEAS"
A.

WHAT IS THE "MARKETPLACE OF IDEAS"?

The "marketplace of ideas" is defined as a sphere in which intangible
values compete for acceptance. 7 Its beneficial social value is based on
the theory that truth prevails in the widest possible dissemination of
information from diverse and antagonistic sources. The term, as used
in this article, is usually traced to Justice Holmes's famous dissent in
Abrams v. United States.8 ForJustice Holmes, the theory of the Constitution,
as embodied in the First Amendment, is that "the ultimate good desired
is better reached by free trade in ideas [and] that the best test of truth
is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of
the market."O Justice Holmes added that we should be "eternally vigilant
against attempts to check the expression of opinions that we loathe"
unless they raise an imminent threat to the country. 0
The marketplace of ideas is important to our democracy, in that
democracy prospers when there is an unrestrained flow of information.
As Justice Holmes wrote, the best test of truth is the success of an
idea in gaining acceptance in free competition with other ideas. Just
as competition produces the best widget, so too competition in the
marketplace of ideas advances truth. As Judge Learned Hand wrote, it
"presupposes that right conclusions are more likely to be gathered out
of a multitude of tongues, than through any kind of authoritative selec7

WEBSTER'S

THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL

DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH

LANGUAGE,

UNABRIDGED 1383 (Merriam-Webster 1986).

8250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
I Id. at 630. Thomas Jefferson likewise noted that truth prevails in this marketplace,
writing, "[I]n every country where man is free to think and to speak, differences of
opinion will arise from difference of perception, and the imperfection of reason; but
these differences when permitted, as in this happy country, to purify themselves by free
discussion, are but as passing clouds overspreading our land transiently and leaving our
horizon more bright and serene." Thomas Jefferson, Letter to Benjamin Waring, 1801,
in 10 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 235 (MEMORIAL EDITION 1904).

Alexis de Tocqueville also touched upon this concept in his observations of America
in his 1831 travels. He viewed the American press skeptically-observing that three-quarters
of the American newspaper was filled with advertisements, with the remainder containing
political news and anecdotes. Given the low entry barriers that allowed the proliferation
of local newspapers in America, each newspaper had limited power individually (in contrast
to the centralized press in France at the time). Yet, when he viewed the American press
collectively in this marketplace, de Tocqueville concluded that the "opinions established
under the dominion of the freedom of the press in the United States are often more
tenacious than those formed elsewhere under the dominion of censorship." ALEXIS DE
TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 178 (Harvey Mansfield & Delba Winthrop trans.

& eds., 2000).
l0Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630.
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tion." 11 Also, to govern themselves, the electorate must have full access
12
to "social, political, esthetic, moral and other ideas and experiences."'
While as Judge Hand noted, to many this marketplace of ideas "is, and3
always will be, folly," we, in our democracy, "have staked upon it our all."'i
An essential goal of the' First Amendment then is to promote this
marketplace of ideas by achieving "the widest possible dissemination of
information from diverse and antagonistic sources."' 4 The First Amendment itself promotes the marketplace of ideas by restricting to varying
degrees governmental restraints on speech. 5 The antitrust laws, we argue,
also promote the marketplace of ideas by reaching anticompetitive private
restraints on this marketplace. The Supreme Court and lower courts
have made this link explicit. In FCC v. National Citizens Committee for
Broadcasting,for example, the Court stated that "application of the antitrust laws to newspapers is not only consistent with, but is actually supportive of the values underlying, the First Amendment."' 6 Similarly, in Red
Lion Broadcasting,the Court stated that "the purpose of the First Amendment [is] to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth
will ultimately prevail, rather than to countenance monopolization of
that market, whether it be by the Government itself or a private
licensee." 17
Thus, an important purpose of the First Amendment is to preserve
an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail,
rather than to countenance monopolization of that market, whether it
be by the government, by companies, or by any individual. As Judge
Greene wrote in the AT&Tcase, "as the Supreme Court has recognized,
in promoting diversity in sources of information, the values underlying
the First Amendment coincide with the policy of the antitrust laws."' 8
B.

THE ISSUE

Is

TIMELY AND RIPE

The issue of whether the antitrust analysis should include a merger's
impact on the marketplace of ideas is timely and ripe for consideration.
1 United

States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943), affd, 326 U.S.

1 (1945).
12 Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969).

13Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. at 372.
14Associated Press, 326 U.S. at 20.
15The First Amendment, after all, begins with "Congress shall make no law..." U.S.
CONST. amend. I.

16436 U.S. 775, 800 n.18 (1978).
17395 U.S. at 390.
18United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Stipp. 131, 184 (D.D.C. 1982), affd sub noma.Maryland
v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983).
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Moreover, as media mergers continue, this issue will remain-and,
indeed, may take on increasing significance.
In recent years, the media appears to be consolidating. AOL has
acquired Time Warner, which in turn acquired Turner Broadcasting
System; Viacom acquired CBS, which had merged with Westinghouse;
Disney acquired CapCities, which had acquired ABC; News Corp.
acquired Twentieth Century Fox and Metromedia TV. 9 Whether American media are becoming more competitive or more concentrated is an
empirical question. It is beyond doubt, however, that media firms on
the scale of the larger manufacturing firms have arisen in recent years,
20
with annual revenues in the tens of billions of dollars.
As this consolidation occurs, especially after the enactment of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996,21 the issue of antitrust review of the
marketplace of ideas is increasingly raised-usually by the press and
elected officials rather than by the antitrust agencies. 22 Underlying the
19COLUMBIA JOURNALISM REVIEW'S Internet site identifies the holdings of the major
media companies. See http://www.cjr.org/owners/.
20 Eli Noam, Media Concentrationin the United States: Industry Trends and Regulatory Response,
available at http://www.vii.org/papers/medconc.htm. As Eli Noam has observed, it is not
obvious that media concentration is increasing. First, although firms have been growing
in size, the media market as a whole (which Professor Noam defines as the market for
broadcast, cable, print, and content) has also been growing rapidly. Second, firms have
been crossing lines that once divided the media, telecommunications, and computer
industries. There have been significant changes from the early 1980s, when CBS, NBC,
and ABC collectively had more than 90 percent of television viewership, AT&T had 80
percent of local telephone service as well as almost 100 percent of long distance service,
and IBM accounted for more than 75 percent of the computer market. Under Eli Noam's
preliminary estimations, the overall concentration of the information industry has
remained "fairly consistent" during the merger-intensive period of 1983-1984 through
1998. It declined from 1993 to 1995, and then rose again to levels that are (depending
on the index used) either still slightly lower than before or slightly higher. See Eli Noam,
Are American Media Becoming More Concentrated? A Decade's Empirical Evidence (Preliminary Working Draft, Oct. 1998), availableat http://www.tprc.org/abstracts98/noam.txt.
This reflects, for Professor Noam, that the growth of the industry has kept pace with the
growth of its participants. He is currently preparing a book for publication that seeks to
answer this empirical question. ELI NOAM, MEDIA CONCENTRATION IN AMERICA (forthcoming).
21 Pub. L. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified in scattered sections of Titles 15, 18 & 47 of
the United States Code (West Supp. 1997)).
22 See, e.g., Bryan Gruley, Pitofsky Will Test Marketplace of Ideas Theory in FTC's Review of
Time Warner-TurnerDea4 WALL ST. J., Oct. 9, 1995, at A14, available at 1995 WL 9903008;
James Bock, Citizen Kane as Conglomerate, BALTIMORE SUN, Apr. 3, 1996, at 2A, available at
1996 WL 6612466; Alexandra Marks, BigRadio MergerFuels Concern overDiversity,CHRISTIAN
SCIENCE MONITOR, June 24, 1996, at 8, available at 1996 WL 5042456; Alexandra Marks,
Mergers May Give Viewers Less Choice, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, July 11, 1996, at 1,
availableat 1996 WL 5042828; Michael J. Mandel, All these Mergers Are Great, But.... Bus.
WK., Oct. 18,1999, at 48, availableat 1999 WL 27295621; Press Release, Sen. Paul Wellstone,
Wellstone Wants TougherFCCand Antitrust Review of Media and Telecom Mergers (Oct. 7, 1999),
available at 1999 WL 28845779.

ANTITRUST LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 69

policy discussions in this area is the concern that regulatory liberalization
has not led to openness and competition but rather to a new level of
media concentration. As Senator Michael DeWine observed:
In radio, in newspapers, and now in television, we are beginning to see
the trend toward consolidation that has swept through so many other
industries during the last few years. While many of these mergers have
been pro-competitive, and helped provide consumers with a better
product at a better price, we need to be especially careful when we are
dealing with companies that provide information-because the free
flow of information is crucial for a democracy to function. We must
of ideas, and excessive concentrahave competition in the marketplace
23
tion will hinder that competition.
Even a media conglomerate expressed the same concerns about the
marketplace of ideas when Tele-Communications, Inc. (TCI) proposed
acquiring Paramount. Rival Viacom (which was much smaller at the
time) sought to challenge the transaction in part based on its impact
on the marketplace of ideas. As Viacom alleged in its complaint: "Indeed,
the power that TCI would have to control programming and cable
distribution is dangerous enough by itself, but when coupled with the
publishing, television and motion picture production and other interests
of Paramount, the threat to competition-and fundamental First Amend' 24
ment principles-is substantially increased.
Similar allegations were directed publicly at Viacom when it sought
to acquire CBS. Notably the Chairman and the Ranking Member of the
Senate Subcommittee on Antitrust, Business Rights and Competition
both recognized that
[m] ergers like Viacom-CBS often have the potential to bring efficiencies
to the marketplace, and bring benefits to both the businesses involved
and consumers ...
[However] the sheer size and scope of this proposed merger-the
latest among large media and entertainment companies-require us
to take a close look at its impact on both the antitrust landscape and
the marketplace of ideas. Indeed, by adding CBS' stable of television
and radio interests to its already significant cable, film and publishing
its ability to influence the
holdings, Viacom will dramatically increase
25
information delivered to consumers.
23Hearing on the Viacom/CBS Merger: Media Competition and Consolidation in the
New Millennium Before the Senate Antitrust, Business Rights, and Competition Subcommittee, 106th Cong., Oct. 28,1999 (prepared opening statement of Sen. Michael DeWine).
214
Amended Complaint 191, Viacom Int'l v. Tele-Communications, Inc., No. 93 Civ.
6658 (KC) (S.D.N.Y.). Viacom ended up acquiring Paramount.
25Statement by U.S. Senators Michael DeWine and Herbert Kohl, Chairman and Ranking
Member of the Senate Subcommittee on Antitrust, Business Rights, and Competition, on
the Proposed Viacom-CBS Merger, 106th Cong., Sept. 7, 1999, available at 1999 WL
2226549.
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Echoing the concerns raised by Justice Frankfurter in his concurring
opinion in Associated Press v. United States,26 Senator DeWine stated in
connection with the Viacom/CBS merger: "This is not a mere commodity
we're talking about. It's something more fundamental-information in
'27
a democracy.
More recently, the marketplace of ideas arose in AOL's acquisition
of Time Warner. "In evaluating AOL Time Warner and, indeed, Internet
and media competition generally, one of our primary concerns has been
ensuring that content is delivered on a nondiscriminatory basis in order
to promote the greatest possible diversity of expression and competition in the marketplace of ideas," Senators DeWine and Kohl wrote to
FCC Chairman William Kennard and FTC Chairman Robert Pitofsky.28
The two senators again were interested in this transaction's impact on
the marketplace of ideas: "Is this merger the beginning of the end of
the Internet as an effective counterweight to traditional media outlets," the two senators asked, "or is this just another step on the road to
29
making the Internet a more useful and usable source of information?"
Chairman Pitofsky likewise recently addressed these concerns in
describing the interplay between antitrust analysis and diversity of expression. In an interview in the Washington Post about the AOL-Time Warner
transaction, Chairman Pitofsky repeated Justice Frankfurter's concerns
in Associated Press, stating:
Antitrust is more than economics .... And I do believe if you have
issues in the newspaper business, in book publishing, news generally,
entertainment, I think you want to be more careful and thorough in
your investigation than if the very same problems arose in cosmetics, or
lumber, or coal mining. I mean, if somebody monopolizes the cosmetics
fields, they're going to take money out of consumers' pockets, but the
implications for democratic values are zero. On the other hand, if they
monopolize books, you're talking about implications that go way beyond
30
what the wholesale price of the books might be.
The parties in AOL/Time Warner eventually entered a consent decree,
which was "intended to ensure that this new medium, characterized by
26 326 U.S. at 27-28.

27Karl Taro Greenfeld, The CBS-Viacom Merger, TIME, Sept. 20, 1999, at 48, available at
1999 WL 25725375.
28 Paige Albiniak, Routing Favoritism, BROADCASTING & CABLE, May 15, 2000, at 14,

availableat 2000 WL 12310124; see also Robert B. Reich, AOL-Time Warner's Kingly Prerogative,
AM. PROSPECT, Feb. 14, 2000, at 56, available at 2000 WL 4739703.

29Peter S. Goodman & John Schwartz, Deal Stirs Concerns About Internet Access, WASH.
POST, Jan. 11, 2000, at El, availableat 2000 WL 2279315.
30Alec Klein, A Hard Look at Media Mergers, WASH. POST, Nov. 29. 2000, at El, available

at 2000 WL 29918451 (quoting Robert Pitofsky, FFC Chairman).
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openness, diversity and freedom, will not be closed down as a result of
this merger."3
The issue of a media merger's impact on the marketplace of ideas
will persist and even build, so long as media mergers continue. The issue
then is whether a media merger's impact on the marketplace of ideas
is an appropriate consideration for the federal antitrust agencies.
C.

APPROACH IF MARKETPLACE OF IDEAS IS
NOT PART OF ANTITRUST ANALYSIS

We argue in this article that the federal' antitrust agencies should
consider the implications of media mergers on the marketplace of ideas.
In contrast to our proposed approach, the Department of Justice in its
recent radio merger consent decrees evaluates the mergers' impact on
advertising rates under the Horizontal Merger Guidelines and is silent on
the marketplace of ideas. For example, in the matter of Clear Channel's
acquisition of AMFM, the Department of Justice alleged in its complaint
that the sale of radio advertising time was a relevant product, and higher
advertising prices and lower quality of service to advertisers were the
likely competitive effects. 32 The focus in this and other Department of
Justice consent decrees is on advertising price competition as evaluated
under the Horizontal Merger Guidelines. The consent decrees acknowledge that radio stations also compete on advertising services-for example, by offering live remote broadcasts from an advertiser's place of
business-but this tends to be a value-added feature and is not the
primary focus of the relief obtained.
The first question under the Horizontal Merger Guidelines for the
radio mergers is: what is the relevant product or service? Is it the airing
S Statement by FTC Chairman Pitofsky, in Dec. 14, 2000, FTC Press Release, "FTC
Approves AOL/Time Warner Merger with Conditions," available at http://www.ftc.gov/
opa/2000/12/aol.htm. As part of the consent decree, which is effective for a five-year
term, AOL Time Warner is (1) required to open its cable system to competitor Internet
Service Providers (ISPs); (2) prohibited from interfering with the content passed along
its bandwidth contracted for by ISPs not affiliated with AOL Time Warner; and (3)
prevented from discriminating on the basis of affiliation in the transmission of content,
or from entering into exclusive arrangements with other cable companies with respect to
ISP services. Id.; see also Analysis of Proposed Consent Order to Aid Public Comment filed
in In the Matter of America Online, Inc., and Time Warner Inc., Docket No. C-3989, available
at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/12/aolanalysis.pdf.
32Complaint for Injunctive Relief, United States v. Clear Channel Communications, Inc.
and AMFM Inc., No. 00-2063 (D.D.C. filed Aug. 29, 2000) (complaint filed with consent
decree), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f6300/6329.htm; see also United States
v. CBS Corp. and American Radio Sys. Corp., 63 Fed. Reg. 18,036 (1998) (proposed decree
requiring divestiture of radio stations to cure anticompetitive effect in radio advertising
market); United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. and Infinity Broad. Corp., 61 Fed.
Reg. 63,861 (1996) (same).
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of radio programming that is "consumed" by the listening audience? Or
is it the sale of advertising time-stated otherwise, the "sale" of the
listening audience to advertisers? There is a potential tension here
because more advertising (up to a point) is viewed as "good" by advertisers
but as "bad" by listeners.
While there are a number of possible product markets, the Antitrust
Division has focused in its radio consent decrees on the mergers' impact
on advertisers and advertising rates. Under the Guidelines's approach,
whether radio advertising is a relevant product market is based in part on
advertisers' likely response to a "small but significant and nontransitory
increase" in the advertising rates of the merging radio stations. Would
large numbers of advertisers shift to other media? Are there attributes
of radio advertising that make other media poor substitutes to many
advertisers? Can stations identify advertisers with strong radio preferences and selectively raise prices? These are some of the antitrust product
market questions addressed in the radio merger consent decrees.33
Similarly, in assessing competitive effects, the Antitrust Division
inquires whether advertisers will end up paying more or getting less after
a radio merger.3 4 Some of the issues addressed in these consent decrees
include: Have advertisers lost the ability to play one of the merging
company's radio stations off the other company's stations to get better
advertising rates? Can advertisers buy around the merged entity to reach
a particular audience demographic? Put another way, after the merger,
can advertisers reach their target audience with equivalent efficiency
without using the merged company's radio stations?
The Antitrust Division's radio merger consent decrees do not address
nonprice competition unrelated to advertising, including the quality of
programming, listener choice, or the likely impact of these mergers on
the marketplace of ideas. This is in contrast to. a recent newspaper
merger, where the Antitrust Division challenged the merger in part based
on the loss of editorial competition."
The federal antitrust agencies in the future will likely evaluate under
the Horizontal Merger Guidelines the media merger's impact on advertisers and the rates they pay for advertising. We propose that the federal
'3 See, e.g., Complaint for Injunctive Relief
11-14, United States v. Clear Channel
Communications, Inc. and AMFM Inc., No. 00-2063 (D.D.C. filed Aug. 29, 2000), available
at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f6300/6329.htm.
- Id.
21-25.
35Community Publishers, Inc. v. Donrey Corp., 892 F. Supp. 1146 (W.D. Ark. 1995),
affd, 139 F.3d 1180 (8th Cir. 1998). We discuss later in this article this case and other
newspaper mergers as support for our proposition.
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antitrust agencies not confine their analyses to the merger's impact on
advertising rates. Instead, the agencies should look beyond a media
merger's impact on advertising rates and services and consider its impact
on nonprice competition, which includes the marketplace of ideas. The
next section outlines the support in the legislative history of the antitrust
laws and case law for analyzing the marketplace of ideas under the
antitrust laws.
II. ANTITRUST REVIEW OF THE MARKETPLACE
OF IDEAS IS CONSISTENT WITH LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY AND CASE LAW
A.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE SHERMAN AND CLAYTON ACTS
SUPPORTS INCLUSION OF MARKETPLACE OF IDEAS
IN ANTITRUST ANALYSIS

Three interrelated points from the legislative history of the Sherman
and Clayton Acts support inclusion of the marketplace of ideas in the
antitrust analysis of media mergers. First is the belief that, unless checked,
industries may concentrate to such a degree that they could hamper our
democracy. Second, if such concentration is not checked in its incipiency,
more intrusive and undesirable governmental regulation may be
required-which would be especially undesirable to the media industry.
Third, the marketplace of ideas is subject to antitrust scrutiny. As the cosponsor of the 1950 Amendments to the Clayton Act stated, communities
clearly benefit from this competing "clash of opinion," and the antitrust
laws are intended to preserve this form of competition.
1. Sherman Act
One concern in the debates leading to the passage of the Sherman
Act 6 was that a monopolist, unless checked, could hamper our democracy. Senator Sherman described a monopoly as a "kingly prerogative"
inconsistent with our democratic ideals, that "should be subject to the
strong resistance of the State and national authorities. '3 7 If our democracy will "not endure a king as a political power we should not endure
a king over the production, transportation, and sale of any of the necessaries of life." 8
As later observed by the Supreme Court, the
main cause which led to the legislation was the thought that it was
required by the economic conditions of the times; that is, the vast
s 26 Stat. 209, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7.
.7 21 CONG. Ric. 2457 (1890).
Is Id.
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accumulation of wealth in the hands of corporations and individuals,
...and the widespread impression that their power had been and would
be exerted to oppress individuals and injure the public generally. 9
As Justice Harlan expressed it, "the conviction was universal that the
country was in real danger from another kind of slavery sought to be
fastened on the American people; namely, the slavery that would result
from aggregations of capital in the hands of a few individuals and
corporations ....
-40 This "economic slavery" was perceived as a threat
to our democracy. Similarly, Judge Learned Hand noted in Alcoa that
intertwined in the antitrust laws was "the belief that great industrial
consolidations are inherently undesirable, regardless of their economic
results." 4 1 The court, quoting Senator Sherman, found that Congress in
1890 intended to put an end to great aggregations of capital because
of the helplessness of the individual before them:
The popular mind is agitated with problems that may disturb social
order, and among them all none is more threatening than the inequality
of condition, of wealth, and opportunity that has grown within a single
generation out of the concentration of capital into vast combinations
to control production and trade and to break down competition. These
combinations already defy or control powerful transportation corporations and reach State authorities. They reach out their Briarean arms
to every part of our country. They are imported from abroad. Congress
alone can deal with them, and if we are unwilling or unable there will
soon be a trust for every
production and a master to fix the price for
42
every necessity of life.
Congress's concerns then with trusts and monopolies were at their
origins not rooted in technical analysis of possible efficiencies; rather,
our democratic values were at the core of the debate.
2. The Clayton Act as Amended by the
Celler-Kefauver Amendments of 1950
Mergers, including media mergers, are primarily reviewed under Section 7 of the Clayton Act4 3 rather than the Sherman Act. The legislative
history of the Celler-Kefauver Act, which amended Section 7, reveals
4
concern about political as well as economic values.
39Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 50 (1910).
40Id. at 83 (Harlan, J., concurring and dissenting).
41United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 428 (2d Cir. 1945).
42Id. at 428 n.1 (quoting 21 CONG. REc. 2460).

4315 U.S.C. § 18.
44Section 7's usefulness in preventing anticompetitive mergers was diminished as a result
of a series of Supreme Court decisions beginning shortly after its enactment in 1914. In
1950, Congress amended Section 7 by passage of the Celler-Kefauver Act, ch. 1184, 64
Stat. 1125 (1950) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 18, 21).
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Overall, the dominant themes pervading Congress's consideration of
the Celler-Kefauver amendments were the perception of a "rising tide
of economic concentration in the American economy"45 and the belief
"that increased economic concentration might threaten other fundamental values of a non-economic nature. 4 6 Moreover, the House debates
show that Congress was concerned not only about industrial products,
such as coal, steel, and oil. Significantly, Congress debated the marketplace of ideas, specifically the loss of editorial competition resulting
from newspaper mergers.
Mr. ELLSWORTH. I am thinking of the type of mergers that have
taken place over the country, the merger of newspapers in cities or
towns where there are two newspapers, and the competition is virtually
destructive to each, and ultimately they reach an agreement whereby
one will sell to the other. Would this act prevent any such thing?
Mr. CELLER. I think this act might be construed to prevent that
kind of merger. In my humble opinion there should be preclusion of
merging one newspaper with another where the effect would be only
one newspaper. In any community there should be clash of opinion.
We should not have opinion all one-sided. There should be both sides
submitted to the populace. Any community formerly 4supplied
with two
7
papers would be at a disadvantage if they combined.
In the 1950 debates, Senator Kefauver also spoke broadly about the
dangers that economic power may have on our democracy, stating that
"When [the American people] lose the power to direct their own eco'4 8
nomic welfare they also lose the means to direct their political future.
And the Senator referred to the threat this economic power poses to
our democracy:
I am not an alarmist, but the history of what has taken place in other
nations where mergers and concentrations have placed economic control in the hands of very few people is too clear to pass over easily. A
point is eventually reached, and we are rapidly reaching that point in
this country, where the public steps in to take over when concentration
and monopoly gain too much power. The taking over by the public
through its government always follows one or two methods and has
one or two political results. It either results in a Fascist state or the
nationalization of industries and thereafter a Socialist or Communist
state.49
11Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 315 (1962).
46

4

EARL W. KINTNER, THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS

AND RELATED STATUTES

47House Debate,

3611 (1978).

81st Cong., 1st Sess., Aug. 15, 1949, repinted in 4 KINTNER, supra note

46, at 3481.
4
1Id. at 3611.
4996 CONG. Rc. 16,452 (1950) (remarks of Sen. Kefauver).
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More broadly, the idea that concentration brought about by mergers
threatens political values was already well developed when Congress took
up the Celler-Kefauver amendments. It was alluded to in the original
Clayton Act debates. 50 It gained prominence in 1938, when President
Franklin D. Roosevelt in his message to Congress advocated strengthening the antitrust laws because the alternatives were more intrusive.5" And
in 1948 the FTC issued a report declaring:
No great stretch of the imagination is required to foresee that if nothing
is done to check the growth in concentration, either the giant corporations will ultimately take over the country, or the Government will be
impelled to step
in and impose some form of direct regulation in the
52
public interest.
B.

LEADING SUPREME COURT CASES ON THE
MARKETPLACE OF IDEAS

The debate on the antitrust treatment of the marketplace of ideas
can be traced. through the majority and dissenting opinions in two
Supreme Court decisions decided nearly fifty years apart: United States
v. Associated Press53 and Turner BroadcastingSystem v. FCC.54 We focus on
these two Supreme Court cases because the majority and dissenting
justices describe the types of concerns that the antitrust agencies should
now address. But both the majority and dissenting justices believed, as
do we, that the antitrust laws apply to private restraints that impede the
free flow of information in the marketplace of ideas. Thus, the divergence
between the majority and the dissent is not whether antitrust laws should
apply to this marketplace. Instead, the divergences are in three areas:
whether the government is remedying a problem in the marketplace of
ideas (or creating a problem); the standard of proof for establishing
the antitrust injury; and the scope of the relief needed. The essence of
"t The House Committee Report to the original Clayton Act stated, "[t]he concentration
of wealth, money, and property in the United States under the control and in the hands
of a few individuals or great corporations has grown to such an enormous extent that
unless checked it will ultimately threaten the perpetuity of our institutions." H.R. REP.
No. 627, 63d Cong., at 19 (1914), reprinted in 2 KINTNER, supra note 46, at 1089, 1099.
51The President said that the rise in private power threatened democratic institutions
and could call forth a dramatic and matched response. Consequently, the "enforcement
of free competition is the least regulation a business can expect." Message from President
Franklin D. Roosevelt to the Congress Transmitting Recommendations Relative to the
Strengthening and Enforcement of the Antitrust Laws, Apr. 29, 1939, reprintedin 4 KINTNER,
supra note 46, at 3408.
52 Report of the Federal Trade Commission, The Merger Movement: A Summary Report
(1948), reprinted in 4 KINTNER, supra note 46, at 3456.
53326 U.S. 1 (1945).
-4 512 U.S. 622 (1994).
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the Court's debate lies in how-not whether-the government should
proceed into the thicket of the marketplace of ideas.
1. Associated Press
The seminal decision on the applicability of the antitrust laws on
private restraints in the marketplace of ideas is United States v. Associated
Press,55 where the United States challenged under the Sherman Act the
organization's restraints on new members joining the Associated Press
(AP), and the restraints on AP members selling news to nonmembers.
It was more difficult for newspapers that competed with AP-member
newspapers to join the AP than newspapers that did not compete with
an AP-member newspaper. But AP was not the sole news service in the
United States, nor was it shown that access to AP was essential to a
newspaper's growth. Instead, newspapers, such as the New York Daily
News, had sizeable increases in their circulation before becoming AP
members.5 6 Moreover, the lower court found that AP did not monopolize
or dominate the collection of, furnishing of, access to, or transmission
of news.5 7 Instead, at least two significant news collection rivals performed
functions similar to the AP.58 And many newspapers (more than 300 of
the 1,274 members of AP) also subscribed to these rival news collection agencies.5 9
The heart of the government's case was that AP had, by concerted
action, set up a system of bylaws that prohibited all AP members from
selling news to nonmembers, and that granted each member powers to
block its nonmember competitors from membership. A divided threejudge district court panel held that the bylaws in their current form were
unlawful, and entered an injunction. 60 In affirming, the Supreme Court
majority did not rest its decision on microeconomic market definitions
and on demand substitutability issues. Nor did the majority of justices
jump through the typical antitrust hoops of defining a relevant market,
determining market share and the restraints' impact on price, and examining issues of entry or expansion by the other news wire services. Rather,
the majority was satisfied that AP was sufficiently large to impact the
marketplace of ideas, in that it was "a vast, intricately reticulated, organization, the largest of its kind, gathering news from all over the world,
the chief single source of news for the American press, universally agreed
.52 F. Supp. 362 (S.D.N.Y. 1943), affd, 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
6Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. at 367.
7Associated Press, 326 U.S. at 42.
58Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. at 366.
I( Id. at 367.
61Id. at 375.

2001]

THE MARKETPLACE OF IDEAS

to be of prime consequence." 61 The fact "that an agreement to restrain
trade does not inhibit competition in all of the objects of 62that trade
cannot save it from the condemnation of the Sherman Act.
Second, for both the lower court and Supreme Court, this case was
not about a competitive restraint that affected the price of ordinary
commodities, such as peanuts or potatoes. It was about who we are as a
nation. Justice Frankfurter brought home this sentiment in his concurring opinion:
[While a commercial enterprise, AP] has a relation to the public interest
unlike that of any other enterprise pursued for profit. A free press is
indispensable to the workings of our democratic society. The business
of the press, and therefore the business of the Associated Press, is the
promotion of truth regarding public matters by furnishing the basis
for an understanding of them. Truth and understanding are not wares
like peanuts or potatoes. And so, the incidence of restraints upon the
promotion of truth through denial of access to the basis for understanding calls into play considerations very different from comparable
restraints in a cooperative enterprise having merely a commercial
aspect.63

In contrast, the dissenting justices were alarmed by the prospect that
the antitrust laws might be used for political meddling into the press.
First,Justice Roberts questioned whether the news could ever be monopolized-as "the events happening in the world are as open to all men as
the air or the sunlight" so "[s]urely the supply of reporters is not less
difficult to monopolize than the events to be reported." 6
61Id. at 18 (quoting 52 F. Supp. at 373 (internal quotations omitted)). Judge Hand
noted that 81 percent of the morning newspapers of the United States and 59 percent
of the evening papers were members of AP. Id. at 366.
62 Associated Press, 326 U.S. at 17.
63 Id. at 27-28 (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring). Moreover, writing for the majority, Justice
Black found that applying the antitrust laws to the media did not violate the First Amendment-rather it comports with the obligation of the United States tinder that Amendment:
It would be strange indeed, however, if the grave concern for freedom of the
press which prompted adoption of the First Amendment should be read as a
command that the government was without power to protect that freedom. The
First Amendment, far from providing an argument against application of the
Sherman Act, here provides powerful reasons to the contrary. That Amendment
rests on the assumption that the widest possible dissemination of information
from diverse and antagonistic sources is essential to the welfare of the public,
that a free press is a condition of a free society. Surely a command that the
government itself shall not impede the free flow of ideas does not afford nongovernmental combinations a refige if they impose restraints upon that constitutionally guaranteed freedom. Freedom to publish means freedom for all and not for
some. Freedom to publish is guaranteed by the Constitution, but freedom to
combine to keep others from publishing is not.
Id. at 20.
6 Id. at 43 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
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Second, the dissenting justices were disturbed by governmental intervention in the marketplace of ideas, believing that the majority's
approach would likely cause more damage to the First Amendment than
any private restraint by AP. Justice Murphy noted this was the first time
"the Sherman Act has been used as a vehicle for affirmative intervention
6
by the Government in the realm of dissemination of information.
Such intrusion, the dissenting justices feared, would be "the first step in
the shackling of the press. '66 While no higher standard of proof is
required for an antitrust violation by the media, Justice Murphy urged
the Court to be "particularly vigilant"-given the implications of the
government regulating the press. 67 Before the government is entitled
"to enjoin a combination or conspiracy alleged to be in restraint of
news dissemination it must be shown by competent evidence that such
combination or conspiracy has in fact resulted in restraints or will inevita'6
bly produce actual restraints in the future.
In Associated Press, the majority and dissenting justices believed, as do
we, that the antitrust laws apply to private restraints that impede the free
flow of information in the marketplace of ideas. The debate concerned
the standard of proof for establishing the antitrust injury and the scope
of the relief needed.
2. Turner Broadcasting
The debate between the majority and dissenting justices in Associated
Press resurfaced forty-nine years later, in Turner Broadcasting System v.
FCC,69 concerning the constitutionality of the "must-carry" provisions of
the 1992 Cable Act. 70 The issue in Turner did not directly involve the
65Id. at 51 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
66 Id.

at 48 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
67Id. at 52-53 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
68Id.

69512 U.S. 622 (1994).
70 Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-

385, 106 Star. 1460 (1992 Cable Act). In enacting the 1992 Cable Act, the Senate was
concerned about the dramatic increase in concentration of the cable media:
By 1990, the five largest cable operators served nearly half the country's cable
subscribers. S. REP. at 32. Witnesses testified that as a result of this increase in
concentration "the large MSOs [multiple system operators] have the market
power to determine what programming services can 'make it' on cable." S. REP.
at 33, 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1167. Based upon this and related evidence, the
Congress found that "[t]he potential effects of ...concentration [in the cable
industry] are barriers to entry for new programmers and a reduction in the
number of media voices available to consumers." 47 U.S.C. § 521 (a) (4). It also
found that "[tihere is a substantial governmental and First Amendment interest
in promoting a diversity of views provided through multiple technology media."
Id. § 521(a) (6).
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antitrust laws. Rather, the issue was whether the must-carry provisions
of the 1992 Cable Act passed constitutional muster. But the same antitrust
concerns as in Associated Press about the marketplace of ideas surfaced:
the standard of proof for establishing the antitrust injury, and the scope
of the relief needed.
At issue in Turnerwas whether a transmitter of media (the cable system
operator) that is vertically integrated with the content provider (a studio)
could use its market power to exclude rival media. A cable system operator can select the stations it will carry on its cable system. Congress
passed the 1992 Cable Act, in part, to address concerns that cable system
operators would favor their own programming-e.g., that Time Warner
cable would carry programs and movies created by Warner Bros. studios-rather than carry local independent programs. The Act requires
a cable system with more than 300 subscribers and twelve channels to
set aside up to one-third of its channels for local commercial broadcast
stations that request carriage. 71 The debate before the Supreme Court
in Turner was in part whether the rival (non-integrated) commercial
broadcasters were sufficiently disadvantaged by the vertically integrated
cable owners, and whether the marketplace of ideas would diminish as
a result. The Court also considered whether cable systems (apart from
their incentives to favor their own content) would have any incentive to
carry a competing communications medium.
The plurality in Turner remanded for more fact finding, namely,
whether the threat to the commercial broadcasters was real. 72 This
entailed additional inquiry: first, whether many broadcast stations would
be dropped or repositioned in the absence of the statute; and second,
whether the affected broadcasters, if dropped, would suffer financial
difficulties as a result.7 After eighteen months of additional fact finding,
the three-judge district court, in a divided opinion, granted summary
judgment for the FCC and other federal defendants. 74 The district court
found that the expanded record contained substantial evidence to support Congress's predictive judgment that the must-carry provisions further important governmental interests in preserving cable carriage of
local broadcast stations, and that the provisions are narrowly tailored to
promote those interests. The district court concluded that the mustTime Warner Entm't v. United States, 211 F.3d 1313, 1319-20 (D.C. Cir. 2000), cert. denied,
121 S. Ct. 1167 (2001).
7147 U.S.C. § 534(b)(1)(B).
72 Turner, 512 U.S. at 668.
71Id. at 667.
74819 F. Supp. 32, 51 (D.D.C. 1993).

ANTITRUST LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 69

carry provisions were content-neutral "industry specific antitrust and fair
trade" legislation narrowly tailored to preserve local broadcasting beset
by several things: monopoly power in most cable systems, growing concentration in the cable industry, and concomitant risks of programming
decisions driven by anticompetitive policies.75 The Supreme Court
affirmed in Turner 11.76 Justice Breyer, who cast the deciding fifth vote,
affirmed solely on First Amendment diversity principles, and did notjoin
77
the anticompetitive rationale of the remaining four affirming justices.
Both the majority and dissenting justices recognized that the antitrust
laws can be applied to the marketplace of ideas. The Court in Turner,
as in Associated Press, concluded that "assuring that the public has access
to a multiplicity of information sources is a governmental purpose of
the highest order, for it promotes values central to the First Amendment." 78 This follows from the Court's earlier opinions stating that the
First Amendment confers "no right" to broadcasters "to an unconditional
monopoly of a scarce resource." 79 In a medium "not open to all," there
is no sanctuary in the First Amendment "for unlimited private censorship."80 The dissenting justices agreed, stating, "when separated from
anticompetitive conduct, this interest in preserving a 'multiplicity of
broadcast programming sources' becomes poorly defined."'"
But the debate in Turner,as in Associated Press, hinged on the standard
of proof for an antitrust injury in this marketplace of ideas. A plurality
of justices were concerned that the cable companies would use their
"bottleneck monopoly power" to exclude local commercial television
stations from their cable networks.8 2 The 1992 Cable Act sought to eliminate restraints on fair competition in the cable industry. By owning "the
essential pathway for cable speech"-namely, the cable hook-ups-a
cable operator could prevent its subscribers from obtaining access to
programming it chose to exclude. 83 By virtue of their control over these
11Id. at

40, 45-47.

76Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180 (1997) (Turner I).
77Id. at 225-26.
78Turner, 512 U.S. at 663.
79Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 391 (1969).
80Id. at 392.
81Turner I, 520 U.S. at 232 (O'Connor, Scalia, Thomas & Ginsburg, 1J., dissenting); see

also Turner,512 U.S. at 682-83 (O'Connor, Scalia & Ginsburg, JJ.,
concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
82Turner, 512 U.S. at 661.
83 Id. at 656. Evidence indicated that before 1984 cable operators had equity interests
in 38 percent of cable programming networks. By the late 1980s, 64 percent of new cable
programmers were held in vertical ownership. TurnerII, 520 U.S. at 198. By 1994, the 10
largest multiple system operators controlled 63 percent of the nation's cable systems. Id.

20011

THE MARKETPLACE OF IDEAS

facilities, cable operators were in a unique position to exercise control
over the dissemination of ideas. Cable operators, "unlike speakers in
other media, can thus silence the voice of competing speakers with a
mere flick of the switch." 84 Justice Stevens compared the must-carry
mechanism to the relief that might be appropriate for a threatened
violation of the antitrust laws. 85
In upholding the must-carry provisions, the plurality did not focus on
market definition. Five justices observed that broadcast television "is but
one of many means for communication. 86 Instead of traditional antitrust
market definition, thesejustices emphasized the importance of broadcast
television as a source of information for Americans: "by tradition and
use for decades now it has been an essential part of the national discourse
on subjects across the whole broad spectrum of speech, thought, and
87
expression.
The dissenting justices in Turner, as in the dissent forty-nine years
earlier in Associated Press, seemed more concerned about the potential
of harm to the First Amendment by governmental regulation, and the
requisite proof required before government intervention. For the dissent
in both Turnerand Associated Press,government power, rather than private
power, poses the main threat to the First Amendment and the marketplace of ideas. 88 Thus, even if some commercial broadcasters would be
adversely affected by the cable operators, the 1992 Cable Act, in the
dissenters' view, was impermissibly overbroad. These justices recognized
at 206. And by 1994, MSOs serving about 70 percent of the nation's cable subscribers
held equity interests in cable programmers. Id. at 207. The dissenting justices did not
dispute these facts. Id. at 236.
8 Turner, 512 U.S. at 656.
81Id. at 672 (Stevens, J., concurring). But as Turner II made clear, the long-standing
federal policy of preserving a multiplicity of broadcast outlets applies to cases even where
the conduct that threatens it is not motivated by anticompetitive animus or does not rise
to the level of an antitrust violation. Turnerl, 520 U.S. at 194 (citing Capital Cities Cable,
Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691, 714 (1984); United States v. Midwest Video Corp., 406 U.S.
649,665 (1972) (plurality opinion) (FCC regulations "were... avowedly designed to guard
broadcast services from being undermined by unregulated [cable] growth"); National
Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 223-24 (1943) ("'While many of the
network practices raise serious questions under the antitrust laws, ... [i]t is not [the
FCC's] function to apply the antitrust laws as such"')).
86Turner II, 520 U.S. at 194.
87 Id. at 194. The Turnerplurality noted that 40 percent of American households continue
to rely on over-the-air signals for television programming. Despite the growing importance
of cable television and alternative technologies, "broadcasting is demonstrably a principal
source of information and entertainment for a great part of the Nation's population."
Turner BroadcastingSys., 512 U.S. at 663 (quoting United States v. Southwestern Cable Co.,
392 U.S. 157, 177 (1968)).
88Turner, 512 U.S. at 685 (O'Connor, Scalia, Ginsburg & ThomasJJ., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
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that cable operators are indeed monopolists and viewers' preferences will
not always prevail; but to safeguard the cable operators' First Amendment
rights, relief must be tailored to those particular showings of an actual
antitrust injury. Thus, relief would have been limited to only those
commercial broadcasters "that are put in danger of bankruptcy, without
unnecessarily restricting cable programmers in markets where free
broadcasting will thrive in any event."8 9
C. OTHER EXAMPLES WHERE MARKETPLACE OF IDEAS
IS PART OF ANTITRUST ANALYSIS

Beyond the Supreme Court's Associated Press and Turner decisions, a
number of lower courts have considered the impact of a restraint or
merger on the marketplace of ideas. Examples include the AT&T breakup and several newspaper mergers and Joint Operating Agreements
(JOAs), which are discussed below.
1. Break-Up of the Bell System
The marketplace of ideas arose as an issue in the break-up of the Bell
System, one of the milestones of antitrust enforcement. The complaint
in AT&T, filed in 1974, alleged that the Bell System had used its control
over local telephone service to monopolize long-distance service and
the manufacture of telecommunications equipment.90 Defendants countered that their actions had been sanctioned by the FCC and state law.
During the trial, the parties negotiated a proposed decree. The decree
required AT&T to divest its local regional Bell telephone operating
companies (BOCs), required the BOCs to provide interconnection on
a nondiscriminatory basis, barred the BOCs from providing any product
or service other than local telephone service, and freed AT&T from the
constraints of a 1956 decree. With certain modifications, the federal
district court found that the proposed consent decree was within the
reaches of the public interest.91
Before the consent decree, the Bell System simply distributed information provided by others; it was not involved in the business of generating
19Id. at 683 (O'Connor, Scalia, Ginsburg,Jj., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
In Turner II, the four dissenting justices noted that Congress had placed limits upon the
number of cable channels that a cable operator can use for its own affiliated programming.
520 U.S. at 252 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 533(f) (1) (B)). These limits addressed for the dissenting
justices any anticompetitive concerns about the vertically integrated cable operator's
monopoly.
10For a brief history of the 1974 case and earlier government cases, see PETER W. HUBER,
MICHAEL K. KELLOGG & JOHN THORNE, FEDERAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW § 4.4 (2d
ed. 1999).
91United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131, 226-34 (D.D.C. 1982), affd sub nom. Maryland
v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983).
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its own information. The district court was concerned that after the
consent decree, AT&T could use its market power to stifle the marketplace of ideas via the electronic publishing industry, which in the early
1980s, was "still in a fragile state of experimentation and growth and...
electronic information can still most efficiently and most economically
be distributed over AT&T's long distance network."' 92 The district court
felt that the electronic publishing sector held "promise to become an
important provider of information-such as news, entertainment, and
advertising-in competition with the traditional print, television, and
radio media"; indeed, as Judge Greene observed, "it has the potential,
in time, for actually replacing some of these methods of disseminating
information." 93
But if, after the consent decree was entered, AT&T could both generate
and transmit information, the district court opined,
there would be a substantial risk not only that it would stifle the efforts
of other electronic publishers but that it would acquire a substantial
monopoly over the generation of news in the more general sense. Such
a development would strike at a principle which lies at the heart of the
First Amendment: that the94American people are entitled to a diversity
of sources of information.
To address the court's concerns, and prevent AT&T from extending
its monopoly to the dissemination of news and information, the district
court required as a condition of its approval of the proposed decree,
that the decree would be modified to preclude AT&T from entering the
field of electronic publishing until the risk of its domination of that
field abated. 95
In reaching this determination and effectively forcing the parties to
modify the consent decree, Judge Greene noted that the policy of
enhancing the diversity of the marketplace of ideas was appropriate in the
context of antitrust regulation: "as the Supreme Court has recognized, in
promoting diversity in sources of information, the values underlying the
First Amendment coincide with the policy of the antitrust laws."' 96 Also
in reaching this determination, the district court evaluated the marketplace of ideas-not under the microeconomic narrowest-product-market
92 Id. at 223. The court defined electronic publishing as information disseminated to
an unaffiliated person through some electronic means, such as pay television and electronic
publications. Id. at 181 & n.208.

93Id. at
91Id. at
91Id. at
96Id. at
(1978)).

223.
224.
180-81, 185-86.
184 (citing FCC v. Nat'l Citizens Comm. for Broad., 436 U.S. 775, 800 n.18
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approach-but in the context of general trends in concentration in the
marketplace of ideas. From this vantage point, Judge Greene observed
the "unremitting trend toward concentration in the ownership and con97
trol of the media" since the 1950s:
Diversity has disappeared in many areas; newspapers have gone out of
business; others have merged; and much of the flow of news and editorial opinion appears more and more to be controlled and shaped by
the three television networks and a handful of news magazines and
metropolitan newspapers.
This concentration presents obvious dangers even today. Unless care
is taken, both the concentration and the attendant dangers will be
significantly increased by the new technologies. Indeed, it is not at all

inconceivable that electronic publishing, with its speed and convenience
will eventually overshadow the more traditional news media, and that
a single electronic publisher would acquire substantial control over the
provision of news in large parts of the United States. 98
It is unclear whetherJudge Greene would have reached this result under
the current Horizontal Merger Guidelines, which emphasize price competition in narrowly defined markets.
2. Editorial Competition Between Newspapers
Courts also have analyzed the marketplace of ideas under the antitrust
laws in the context of restraints or mergers involving local daily newspapers.
In newspaper mergers, the courts and antitrust agencies routinely
consider a merger's impact on editorial competition (which is akin to
the marketplace of ideas). First Amendment principles come into play,
as the Supreme Court has found that newspapers are "essential" to the
effective functioning of our political system. 99 A "vigorous and dauntless
press" for the Supreme Court was "a chief source feeding the flow of
democratic expression and controversy which maintains the institutions
of a free society."' 00 As Justice Clark explained, "[Bly interpreting to the
citizen the policies of his government and vigilantly scrutinizing the
official conduct of those who administer the state, an independent press

1 552 F.

Supp. at 184.

98 Id. The district court concluded that the restriction on electronic publishing "should

only remain in effect for the period necessary to establish conditions conducive to free
and fair competition" and announced its intention to remove the prohibition, upon
motion, seven years from the entry of the decree. Id. at 186. The restriction was in fact
lifted at the end of that seven-year period. See United States v. Western Elec. Co., 1989-2
Trade Cas. (CCH) 68,673 (D.D.C. July 28, 1989).
99Times-Picayune Publ'g Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 602 (1953).
100 Id.
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stimulates free discussion and focuses public opinion on issues and
officials as a potent check on arbitrary action or abuse." 1 1
Given newspapers' essential role in the marketplace of ideas (and our
democratic system), it is not surprising that the Court has analyzed the
editorial competition among newspapers under the antitrust laws. This
editorial competition is viewed as a form of economic competition.
Newspapers ordinarily derive their revenue from the sale of advertising
space and the sale of the newspaper itself. But the commercial success
of a newspaper depends on the success of the news and editorial operations. 0 2 "The quality, circulation, and advertising revenues of a newspaper are interrelated." 13 The more attractive the newspaper is to its
targeted audience, the more readers it attains. The more readers it
attains, the better is the newspaper's ability to attract advertisers. Consequently, in describing the daily newspaper business, the Supreme Court
stated, "It]here can be little doubt today that the immediate dissemination of news gathered from throughout the nation or the world by
agencies specially organized for that purpose is a part of interstate com04
merce."
The importance of editorial competition, and its economic significance, recently arose in a decision involving the termination of aJOA 05
101Id. Judge Learned Hand shared this view, noting that a newspaper "serves one of the
most vital of all general interests: the dissemination of news from as many different sources,
and with as many different facets and colors as is possible." Associated Press,52 F. Supp. at 372.
102 United States v. Citizen Publ'g Co., 280 F. Supp. 978, 985 (D. Ariz. 1968), affd, 394
U.S. 131 (1969).
103Id.
104
LorainJournal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143, 151 (1951) (citing Associated Press
v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 14 (1945), and Associated Press v. National Labor Relations
Bd., 301 U.S. 103 (1937)). The Lorain Journal refused to sell advertising space to any
business that bought time on a new radio station in a nearby town. The Supreme Court
held that this refusal to deal constituted an attempt to monopolize. The Court noted that
the defendant's refusal to accept advertising was aimed at preserving the local newspaper's
"substantial monopoly" in the mass dissemination of local and national news. LorainJournal,
342 U.S. at 147.
Justice Douglas also expressed his deep concern regarding the effects of newspaper
monopolies:
Where one paper has a monopoly in an area, it seldom presents two sides of an
issue. It too often hammers away on one ideological or political line using its
monopoly position not to educate people, not to promote debate, but to inculcate
in its readers one philosophy, one attitude-and to make money.
The newspapers that give a variety of views and news that is not slanted or
contrived are few indeed. And the problem promises to get worse ....
WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS, THE GREAT RIGHTS 124-25, 127 (E. Cahn ed., 1963) (quoted in
Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 253 (1974)).
105
AJOA is a Faustian bargain whereby the newspapers obtain a limited immunity from
the antitrust laws under the Newspaper Preservation Act (NPA), 15 U.S.C. § 1801 etseq.
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The federal district court held, and the Ninth Circuit did not disagree,
that the editorial competition in aJOA is cognizable under the antitrust
laws, and its elimination would "deprive newspaper readers of free and
open competition in the sale of daily newspapers and their differing
editorial and reportorial voices. ..",0 The district court was not persuaded that this competition between editorial voices "involves some
'non-economic social goal' rather than trade or commerce.' ' 0 7 Rather,
the district court found that "trade or commerce" within the meaning
of the antitrust laws generally comprises "commercial competition in
the marketing of goods and services" and thus includes editorial competition. 0
This exemption enables the local daily newspapers to combine business functions (such
as advertising, gales, printing, and distribution). But, in exchange for this exemption, the
newspapers must maintain separate editorial and reporting staffs and produce separate
newspapers (except in some cases, where the newspapers may produce a joint newspaper
on Sundays). The purpose of this limited antitrust exemption is to preserve the editorial
competition between local daily newspapers when one of the newspapers might otherwise
exit the market. 15 U.S.C. § 1801 (NPA's preamble states "In the public interest of maintaining a newspaper press editorially and reportorially independent and competitive in all
parts of the United States, it is hereby declared to be the public policy of the United
States to preserve the publication of newspapers in any city, community or metropolitan
area where a joint operating agreement has been heretofore entered into because of
economic distress or is hereafter effected in accordance with the provisions of this chapter.") Thus, "a primary intent of the Newspaper Preservation Act was to promote the
diversity of editorial voices among newspapers." Committee for an Independent P-I v.
Hearst Corp., 704 F.2d 467, 480 (9th Cir. 1983); see also 116 CONG. REc. 23,156 (1970)
(Congressman Buchanan stating, "[t]he Newspaper Preservation Act is, in my judgment,
urgently needed to assure the separate news and editorial voices in our Nation's newspapers.
In this important sense it will preserve, rather than adversely affect, free competition.").
106Hawaii v. Gannett Pac. Corp., 99 F. Supp.2d 1241, 1249-50 (D. Haw.), affd, 203
F.3d 832 (9th Cir. 1999). In addition to depriving newspaper readers of free and open
competition in the sale of daily newspapers and their differing editorial and reportorial
voices, the termination of the JOA and closing of one of the newspapers would deprive
advertisers of free and open competition in the market for the differentiated advertising
audiences represented by the two local newspapers, and would deprive creators of news,
editorial, and entertainment content of free and open competition for their output. Id.
at 1250.
107Id. at 1249.

"I Id. (citing Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469 (1940)).
In contrast to Gannett,Judge Vaughn Walker in a JOA termination case involving the
San FranciscoChronicle and Examiner gave little attention to its impact on the marketplace
of ideas. Reilly v. Hearst Corp., 107 F. Supp.2d 1192 (N.D. Cal. 2000). The media industry,
in his view, did not lend itself well to traditional antitrust analysis. Judge Walker believed
that under the "old paradigm," a merger between San Francisco's two largest daily newspapers might well have posed an unquestionable threat of undue concentration. But that
threat is less clear today. Id. at 1201. A new paradigm exists today where the Internet,
television, radio, direct-mail and free dailies have the "actual and potential ability" to
deprive the merging newspapers a significant level of business. Id. at 1200-01. Whether
these alternative media can sufficiently replace the lost editorial competition between the
historic newspaper rivals was left unanswered. This is surprising-especially given Judge
Walker's reference to some questionable goings-on that came to light during the trial.
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Recognizing the important role newspapers play in the marketplace of
ideas and that editorial competition is a form of economic competition,
courts have enjoined or ordered the unwinding of transactions in which
such editorial competition may be substantially lessened." 9 As in any
antitrust merger analysis, the courts define relevant markets. For newspapers, the courts typically have viewed the editorial competition and advertising competition among local daily newspapers as two relevant product
markets." 0 These courts have recognized that news comes from many
sources: newspapers, television, radio, magazines, and more recently the
Internet. These sources all arguably compete for the public's attention.
But these courts have found that both the format and nature of information in local daily newspapers distinguish them from news and entertainment provided by other sources. Daily local newspapers provide a "unique
package" of information to their readers. National newspapers lack the
local news and advertising. Radio and television are primarily dedicated
to entertainment, and their news content lacks the breadth and depth
of daily newspapers. After recognizing editorial competition between
daily local newspapers as a relevant and distinct antitrust product market,
the courts then have enjoined acquisitions (or undone completed transactions) that threaten to substantially lessen that competition."'
D.

CONCLUSIONS FROM LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND CASE LAW

Thus, the legislative history of the antitrust laws, significant Supreme
Court decisions, and case law support the inclusion of the marketplace
of ideas in the antitrust analysis of media mergers. The legislative history
During trial, evidence was presented that senior Hearst executives sought to suppress
critical news stories about the transaction. See Reynolds Holding, Hearst Insisted Examiner
Hold Story on Chronicle,S.F. CHRONICLE, June 9, 2000, at Al, available at 2000 WL 6484201.
And the court found that Hearst offered "to 'horse trade' favorable editorial coverage of
the mayor in return for [Mayor] Brown's support" of Hearst's acquisition of its traditional
rival The San Francisco Chronicle. Reilly, 107 F. Supp.2d at 1207. How these other media
under Judge Walker's new paradigm will prevent such diminution in quality (from selfcensorship and horse trading) is not addressed.
1o9See Community Publishers, Inc. v. Donrey Corp., 892 F. Supp. 1146 (W.D. Ark. 1995),
affid, 139 F.3d 1180 (8th Cir. 1998) (ordering rescission of asset purchase agreement);
United States v. Citizen Publ'g Co., 280 F. Supp. 978 (D. Ariz. 1968), aft'd, 394 U.S. 131
(1969) (ordering divestiture of acquired newspaper and modification of JOA); United
States v. Times Mirror Co., 274 F. Supp. 606 (C.D. Cal. 1967), affd, 390 U.S. 712 (1968)
(ordering complete divestiture).
1 Community Publishers,892 F. Supp at 1156-57 (collecting cases); see also Times-Picayune
Publ'g Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 610 (1953) ("[E]very newspaper is a dual trader
in separate though interdependent markets; it sells the paper's news and advertising
content to its readers; in effect that readership is in turn sold to the buyers of advertising
space.") (case concerned solely advertising market).
" See Community Publishers, 892 F. Supp. at 1179; Citizen Publg, 280 F. Supp. at 993-94;
Times Mirror, 274 F. Supp. at 623-24.
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and case law highlight three important themes: First, the antitrust laws
apply in preserving the "clash of opinion"1 2 in the marketplace of ideas.
The Court, in Associated Press and subsequent cases, has made clear that
application of the antitrust laws to newspapers (as well as other media)
"is not only consistent with, but is actually supportive of the values
1' 13
underlying, the First Amendment."
A second theme is that the courts have looked beyond microeconomic
market definitions, and, in particular, beyond an advertising product
market. The courts mainly note the size of the defendants, the number
of media outlets defendants reach, and the restraints' presumptive
impact on the marketplace of ideas. But the courts typically do not define
relevant markets and assign market shares. The exception would be
the newspaper cases, where the courts have overwhelmingly defined
a relevant product market as the editorial competition among local
daily newspapers.
A third theme is that the courts have not outlined any bright-line
antitrust standards for the marketplace of ideas. Judge Learned Hand in
Associated Press raised the complexities of these issues, but he specifically
declined to resolve them:
We need not therefore say how important the control of news in any
supposititious case must be in order to demand relief; it is enough that
in the case at bar AP is a vast, intricately reticulated, organization, the
largest of its kind, gathering news from all over the world, the chief
single source of news for the American press, universally agreed to be
of prime consequence. Wherever may be the vanishing point of public
concern with any particular source of information, that point is far
114
beyond this service.
112 House Debate, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., Aug. 15, 1949, reprinted in 4 KINTNER, supra note
46, at 3481 (statement of Rep. Celler).
"I FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for Broad., 436 U.S. 775, 800 n.18 (1978) (citing
Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945); Lorain Journal Co. v. United States,
342 U.S. 143 (1951); Citizen Publ'g Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131, 139-40 (1969);
United States v. Radio Corp. of Am., 358 U.S. 334, 351-52 (1959)). But since the FCC in
National Citizens relied "primarily on First Amendment rather than antitrust considerations," the fact that the antitrust laws were fully applicable to newspapers was not a complete
answer to the issues in that case. National Citizens, 436 U.S. at 800 n.18. The marketplace
of ideas also arose in other media industries, such as motion pictures. In United States v.
Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131 (1948), the Court had "no doubt that moving pictures,
like newspapers and radio, are included in the press whose freedom is guaranteed by the
First Amendment." Id. at 166. The Court stated that First Amendment issue "would be
focused here if we had any question concerning monopoly in the production of moving
pictures." Id. But because monopoly in production was eliminated as an issue, the Court
did not have to include the marketplace of ideas in its analysis. Id.
114Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. at 373.
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As the majority and dissenting opinions in Associated Press and Turner
reflect, the ongoing debate is not whether the marketplace of ideas
should be included in the analysis. The larger issues are what should be
the appropriate standard of proof and scope of relief.
III. PROS AND CONS OF INCLUDING THE
MARKETPLACE OF IDEAS
As the previous section discussed, the case law and legislative history
support including the marketplace of ideas in the antitrust analysis of
media industries. But should the federal antitrust agencies in reviewing
the current crop of media mergers consider the merger's impact on the
marketplace of ideas? This section weighs the pros and cons of including
the marketplace of ideas as part of the antitrust analysis. The main
purpose of the section is not to declare a winner in this debate. As
this section outlines, there are legitimate concerns about analyzing the
marketplace of ideas under the antitrust laws. For example, the marketplace of ideas is difficult to quantify. Also, governmental intrusion in
media mergers may undermine this marketplace. We raise these concerns-not to shoot them down like ducks at an arcade-but to emphasize that any governmental antitrust review should incorporate these
concerns in evaluating a media merger.
A.

SIX CONCERNS WITH MAKING THE MARKETPLACE OF IDEAS
PART OF ANTITRUST ANALYSIS

Legitimate concerns arise if the marketplace of ideas is included in
antitrust analysis. We identify six such concerns.
One concern is that the marketplace of ideas is not economic competition under the antitrust laws. To the extent that it seeks to protect
"diversity," it reflects non-economic political and social policy, which
may be better left to Congress and the FCC. For those with a libertarian
bent, the "marketplace of ideas" analysis is nothing more than the government's shackling its values and political agenda onto the press. Some
critics operate under the belief that the federal antitrust agencies are
merely the pawns of well-connected political groups that disrupt efficiency-enhancing transactions," 5 while other observers worry that the
government, even with good intentions, will cause more harm than good

"IAs one critic surmised, "[b] ecause they respond to the demands of competitors, labor
unions, and other well-organized groups having a stake in stopping mergers that promise
to increase economic efficiency, the antitrust authorities all too often succeed, not in
keeping prices from rising, but in keeping them from falling." William Shughart I1, The
Government's War on Mergers: The Fatal Conceit of Antitrust Policy, Cato Policy Analysis No.
323 (Oct. 22, 1998).
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to free speech. This was of particular concern to the dissenting justices
in Associated Press. Unlike the majority, they felt that the nation's experience in World War II dictated caution in this arena. The tragic history
in Europe demonstrated how "despotic governments may interfere with
the press and other means of communication in their efforts to corrupt
6
public opinion and to destroy individual freedom.""
A second concern is that this marketplace of ideas is not readily
susceptible to antitrust analysis under the Horizontal Merger Guidelines.
Initially, one defines the relevant market under the Horizontal Merger
Guidelines using price. One starts, under Section 1.11 of the Horizontal
Merger Guidelines, by determining the customers' likely response to a
"small but significant and nontransitory increase in price" for the merging parties' narrowly defined products. Determining a "small but significant and nontransitory increase in price" would be problematic in the
marketplace of ideas. Many media outlets, such as radio and network
television, do not have a readily definable price for their news. When
one watches the evening network news, one "pays" a nominal amountthe depreciation of one's television set and the electricity required. But
one does not directly pay." 7 Also, how would one compare the disparate
prices for those media outlets with a fee: the monthly Internet fee versus
cable versus a newspaper's newsstand price versus a magazine subscription?
Moreover, the market definition analysis under the Horizontal Merger
Guidelines typically focuses on the degree of substitutability among products. A legitimate concern, then, is how does one measure the degree
of substitutability in a broader marketplace of ideas? What is prized in
the marketplace of ideas is diversity among differentiated products rather
than substitutability. The focus is not only on consumers' shifting
between ABC and CBS evening national news as the primary news source,
but having many independent voices supplying the marketplace with
"'Associated Press, 326

U.S. at 51-52 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
One may indirectly pay via prices affected by the advertised products. For example,
the consumer may indirectly pay for a program by purchasing the advertised product, or
other products the prices of which are affected by the prices of advertised products. But
is advertising competition a good proxy for the marketplace of ideas? No doubt there is
some relationship between the two: a highly rated program, such as 60 Minutes, may
command higher advertising rates. But advertising rates, which are determined in part
by the ability to reach a targeted demographic group, may be influenced by competition
outside the marketplace of ideas, such as direct mail and billboards. Thus, an acquisition
may substantially lessen competition on the marketplace of ideas, but not advertising rates,
and vice versa.
Also, if all the broadcast networks combined their news operations, but each determined
its own advertising rates, the nightly news might still be aired for free, and the ad rates might
remain unchanged, but the nonprice editorial competition would be substantially lessened.
17
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news. In the marketplace of ideas, it may be more harmful to lose a nonsubstitutable alternative than it would be if two close substitutes merge.
Also, how could one assign market shares objectively? Should an influential news source with a limited but powerful readership be assigned
a greater market share in the marketplace of ideas than Entertainment
Tonight? There is a risk that the government will inject its values and
preferences into the media by valuing certain programming more
than others.
A third concern is the General Dynamics problem. In United States v.
General Dynamics Corp., the Court recognized that "[e]vidence of past
production does not, as a matter of logic, necessarily give a proper
picture of a company's future ability to compete.""' Only in examining
"its structure, history and probable future" does one provide "the appropriate setting for judging the probable anticompetitive effect of the
merger."" l9 Even if one could define markets and assign market shares
in the marketplace of ideas,just how reliable would these historic market
shares be under dynamic market conditions? Historic market shares
arguably are meaningless in the dynamic marketplace of ideas. With the
rapid proliferation and evolution of the Internet and satellite television,
the historical market shares of the old print and broadcast media may
overstate the media's future competitive significance.
A fourth and related concern is determining the acceptable thresholds
of market concentration in the marketplace of ideas. Should the concentration levels mirror the levels outlined in Section 1.5 of the Horizontal
Merger Guidelines? Or should the threshold concentration levels be
higher (given the concerns of governmental intrusion in the marketplace
of ideas) or lower (given the concerns of restraints on information
affecting the stability of democracy)? The D.C. Circuit recently raised
this issue with respect to the FCC's cable ownership restriction:
We have some concern how far such a theory may be pressed against
First Amendment norms. Everything else being equal, each additional
"voice" may be said to enhance diversity. And in this special context,
every additional splintering of the cable industry increases the number
of combinations of companies whose acceptance would in the aggregate
lay the foundations for a programmer's viability. But at some point,
surely, the marginal value of such an increment in "diversity" would
not qualify as an "important" governmental interest. Is moving from
100 possible combinations to 101 "important"? It is not clear to us how
a court could determine the point where gaining such an increment
n1415 U.S. 486, 501 (1974).
119Id. at 498 (quoting Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. at 322 n.38); see also
Horizontal Merger Guidelines, supra note 4, § 1.521.
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is no longer important. And it would be odd to discover that although
a newspaper that is the only general daily in a metropolitan area cannot
be subjected to a right of reply, it could in the name of diversity be
forced to self-divide. Certainly the Supreme Court has not gone so far. 2"
A fifth concern is that the marketplace of ideas left alone will do a
better job in diversifying itself than would federal or state authorities.
Restrictions on ownership may actually stymie diversity rather than promote it. Peter Steiner and others have argued that a monopolist may
more likely offer a broader array of programming than if radio outlets
were independently owned. 2 ' For example, if the network news operations were combined under a joint venture, the venture could then
expend resources on covering a broader array of topics and areas. Thus,
four news bureaus in Washington, D.C., would not all cover the President. 12 2 Instead, money could be invested in news bureaus in other
regions of the world. A related argument is that by denying media outlets
the efficiencies of combining their operations, the ownership restrictions
may increase the costs of doing business, hamper growth, limit funds to
invest in new and diverse programming, and ultimately lead to the demise
of smaller media outlets. 22 Thus, this concentration may be inevitable
as firms seek to capture efficiencies.
A sixth concern is that a larger corporation may actually be well
positioned to combat government censorship and support First Amendment freedoms. 124 Smaller companies may be an ineffective counterweight to government censorship-lacking. the deep financial pockets
125
and might of The New York Times and Washington Post.
120Time Warner Entm't Co. v. FCC, 240 F.3d 1126, 1135 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (citation
omitted).
12! See, e.g., Daniel L. Brenner, Ownership and Content Regulation in Merging and Emerging
Media, 45 DEPAUL L. Rv. 1009, 1017 & n.56 (1996) (citing Peter 0. Steiner, Program
Patternsand Preferences, and the Workability Competition in Radio Broadcasting,66 Q.J. ECON.
194, 212-17 (1952)).
122But note that the pooling of resources could also lead to a suboptimal level of
investment and other serious problems, as apparently happened in the November 2000
presidential election with Voter News Service, a consortium set up by five networks and
AP to tabulate election results through exit polling and to convey the results to the six
clients. SeeJoan Konner, James Risser & Ben Wattenberg, Television's Performanceon Election
Night 2000: A Report for CNN (Jan. 29, 2001).
13 See In re Revision of Radio Rules and Polices, 7 F.C.C. Rcd. 2755, 2774 (1992).
124Brenner, supra note 121, at 1027.
125If this were true, however, one would expect that the majority of First Amendment
cases litigated before the Supreme Court would involve the media conglomerates. One
would also expect that the ACLU and similar organizations would favor media mergers
as a safeguard to the First Amendment. Yet, Burt Neuborne, a First Amendment scholar
and former legal director of the ACLU, has argued that the First Amendment does
not disable government from acting to prevent excessive media concentration. See Burt
Neuborne, Media Concentration and Democracy, Panel Three Commentary, 1999 ANN. SURV.
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B.

CONCERNS IF "MARKETPLACE OF IDEAS" WERE
EXCLUDED FROM ANTITRUST ANALYSIS

The six concerns outlined above-while significant-do not ultimately
outweigh the three concerns that would arise if the marketplace of ideas
were excluded from the antitrust analysis.
1. Antitrust Laws Encompass Economic Nonprice Competition
If price competition for advertising and programming were the only
concerns in a media merger, we would likely miss an important part of
the competitive landscape. It is well accepted, and a matter of everyday
experience, that price is not the sole measure of competition. Companies
can, and often do, compete on other dimensions, such as quality, service,
and innovation. This is of particular importance in the Internet, broadcast television, and radio industries, where the competition extends
beyond advertising prices. Consequently, the impact of a restraint or
acquisition on nonprice competition is a legitimate subject for antitrust inquiry.
Recent commentary recognizes the pitfalls of focusing solely on an
acquisition's impact on price, and advocates looking beyond price effects
in merger analysis. Neil W. Averitt and Robert H. Lande note that, "[i]n
certain sectors of the economy-for example, high-tech or media-related
industries-diversity of options may be far more important to consumers
than price competition."1 26 They recognize that price may be an inadequate barometer of competition in the marketplace of ideas:
If the owner of one communications medium were to buy another firm
of the same kind, the acquisition might not concentrate the market
sufficiently to threaten price competition. Being competitive, the market might also soon produce the product menu that consumers desire,
in terms of types and formats of shows. But the market would inevitably
sustain a loss of editorial diversity, and this cannot be recreated through
the normal mechanism of nonprice competition among the surviving
firms; the new products would necessarily bear the editorial stamp of
their common owner. This suggests that media mergers should be
carefully scrutinized for loss of nonprice competition along the dimension of diversity in programming and, where that loss is sufficiently
severe, that they be challenged under the Clayton Act, even if there
has been no showing of harm to price competition.'27
Am. L. 277, 277 (2000); Burt Neuborne, Toward a Democracy-Centered Reading of the First
Amendment, 93 Nw. U. L. REv. 1055, 1057 (1999); Burt Neuborne, First Amendment for the
Rich?, THE NATION, Oct. 9, 2000, at 25.
126Neil W. Averitt & Robert H. Lande, Consumer Sovereignty: A Unified Theory of Antitrust
and Consumer Protection Law, 65 ANTITRUST L.J. 713, 715 (1997).
127 Id. at 752-53 (footnote omitted).
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Averitt and Lande use the example of a merger from five to four in
the book publishing industry. While such a merger may not lead to
higher prices or fewer price options, it "might well lead to a quantifiable
loss of editorial diversity and, thus, to a narrowing of the competing
28
marketplace options expressed in terms of the types of titles offered."
This loss of options, for Averitt and Lande, is sufficient for an antitrust
suit under the "ordinary, universal standards of Section 7, once that
Section has been properly construed to recognize the role of options
129
and of nonprice competition."'
Likewise, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has recognized certain nonprice competition involving the broadcasting industry.
An alleged conspiracy that both reduced "networks' national competition
with alternative programming and reduced local stations' competition
with alternative distribution systems" was found to be a legitimate antitrust injury. 30 Besides eliminating "[a] ctual and potential price competition," the conspiracy allegedly restricted output "and millions of
consumers have lost or risk losing the opportunity to receive higher
quality television reception and additional programming options.''
Similarly, other courts have recognized that nonprice competition can
be an important antitrust consideration, 3 2 and that price alone may be
33
in certain industries an unreliable indicator of market power.1
128Id. The increasing concentration in the book publishing industry (where, according
to one participant, five conglomerates control over 80 percent of book sales) has prompted
some concern from within the industry. See ANDRE SCHIFFRIN, THE BusINESS OF BOOKS:

How

INTERNATIONAL CONGLOMERATES TOOK OVER PUBLISHING AND CHANGED THE WAY

WE READ (2000).

'29Averitt & Lande, supra note 126, at 753. Another approach has been to expand the
concept of "market power" to account for not only microeconomic conceptions of market
power but also the economic power derived from firm size. SeeRudolph Peritz, Some Realism
About Economic Power in a Time of Sectorial Change, 66 ANTITRUST L.J. 247 (1997).
130Primetime 24Joint Venture v. Nat'l Broad. Co., 219 F.3d 92, 103-04 (2d Cir. 2000).
131Id.
'32See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 52 (1911)

("The evils
which led to the public outcry against monopolies and to the final denial of the power
to make them [include] [t]he danger of deterioration in quality of the monopolized
article which it was deemed was the inevitable result[] of the monopolistic control over
its production and sale."). See also FTC v. Superior Ct. Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411,
423-24 (1990) (antitrust laws serve to protect quality of legal advocacy); Nat'l Soc'y of
Prof'I Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 695 (1978) (Sherman Act reflects legislative
judgment that ultimately competition will not only produce lower prices, but also better
goods and services).
113A federal district court recently conceded that a defendant with an 80 to 95 percent
market share displayed "few of the indicia economists associate with dominant market
power." United States v. Franklin Elec. Co., 130 F. Supp.2d 1025, 1029 (W.D. Wis. 2000).
The monopolist was unable to charge supracompetitive prices when it was the only player
in the relevant market between 1988 and 1995. Id. at 1034-35. And its variable margins
(net sales less variable costs) "were flat" during its period as a monopolist. Id. at 1029.
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The FTC and DOJ also have recognized nonprice competition in
their recent Antitrust Guidelines for Collaborations Among Competitors,
where the theory of market power incorporates nonprice competition:
"The creation, increase, or facilitation of market power will likely increase
the ability and incentive profitably to raise price above or reduce output,
quality, service, or innovation below what likely would prevail in the
absence of the relevant agreement." 34 These Guidelines specifically recognize that sellers "also may exercise market power with respect to significant competitive dimensions other than price, such as quality, service,
or innovation."'315 This is a notable improvement over the Horizontal
Merger Guidelines, which were heavily oriented toward price-from
questions of market definition to entry-and which relegated nonprice
16
competition to one footnote.
Nonprice competition happens everyday and is an important aspect
of economic competition. One cannot simply limit the antitrust analysis
37
to tidy industries where price is the sole or primary facet of competition.1
Consequently, the fact that the antitrust inquiry into the marketplace
of ideas may involve nonprice competition should not be a deterrent.
2. Shortcomings of Applying Horizontal Merger Guidelines Rigidly
The microeconomic approach under the Horizontal Merger Guidelines does not neatly fit all industries. The Guidelines are not gospel,
nor do they claim to be: they make clear that "mechanical application
of those standards may provide misleading answers to the economic
questions raised under the antitrust laws.""' Merely because the antitrust
analysis of a particular industry (or the marketplace of ideas) does not
neatly fit the confines of the Horizontal Merger Guidelines does not
justify ignoring the antitrust issues. This is hardly a sound basis for
rejecting an antitrust review of the marketplace of ideas.
But that did not end the court's inquiry. Instead, the district court was persuaded by the
extensive evidence that the monopolist during that same time period "was not overly
concerned about either making improvements in its product or providing excellent service"
and enjoined a joint venture with the only competitor that subsequently emerged. Id.
at 1035-36.
134Federal Trade Commission and U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust Guidelines for
Collaborations Among Competitors § 3.33 (2000), availabeat http://www.ftc.gov.os/2000/
04/ftcdojguidelines.pdf [hereinafter Competitor Collaboration Guidelines].
135Id. § 3.3 n.30.
136SeeHorizontal Merger Guidelines, supra note 4, § 0.1 n.6 ("Sellers with market power
also may lessen competition on dimensions other than price, such as product quality,
service or innovation.").
IS7
"[F]acts cannot be ignored simply because present methods do not permit them to
be described with full scientific rigor." Thomas B. Leary, Freedom as the Core Value of Antitrust
inthe New Millennium, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 545, 556 (2000).
138Horizontal Merger Guidelines, supra note 4, § 0.
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As both sides of the bar recognize, a rigid application of the market
definition standards in the Horizontal Merger Guidelines may provide
misleading answers as to a transaction's anticompetitive effects. This
issue often arises with mergers involving highly differentiated branded
consumer products-where the likely post-merger unilateral effects are
more informative than the market definition. For example, suppose that
two brands are each other's closest substitutes (say, Coke and Pepsi),
and repositioning by other brands to occupy that brand's space would
be unlikely post-merger. Is market definition that important? If Coke
acquired Pepsi, and Coke unilaterally could raise the price of eitheror both-of its brands post-merger, it would not really matter how narrowly or broadly one defined the product market. The product market
conceivably could include other branded colas, private-label colas, other
branded carbonated soft-drinks, or all other beverages that compete for
the consumers' purchase. But the likely post-merger outcome would
remain the same-namely, a unilateral price increase of Coke and/or
Pepsi. If post-merger the parties unilaterally can raise and maintain the
price for one or both of their brands, then it does not really matter how
broadly or narrowly one defines the product market.
A federal district court moved in this direction in FTC v. Staples, Inc. 139
There the district court's analysis did not rest on functional interchangeability of office supply products sold through different outlets. (After
all, you can get the same legal pad if you purchase it from a stationery
store, drug store, or Staples.) Rather, the court was swayed by the localized
competition between the merging parties and the differences in pricing
in geographic markets when one faced competition from the other. 140
Another limitation with a rigid Merger Guidelines approach is that it
is problematic, or as Judge Learned Hand asserted "impossible," to treat
different news services as "interchangeable."' 4 The fact in Associated Press
that excluded newspapers could obtain news from other news services
did not mitigate the antitrust concerns. Nor was the fact that readers
could read the AP news stories in one local newspaper determinative.
139970 F. Supp. 1066 (D.D.C. 1997).

110Id. at 1075-76, 1079-80; see alsoJonathan B. Baker, UnilateralCompetitive Effects Theories
in MergerAnalysis,ANTITRUST, Spring 1997, at 21, 25 (market shares may not capture likely
post-merger price increase in mergers involving close substitutes among differentiated
products); Carl Shapiro, Mergers with DifferentiatedProducts, ANTITRUST, Spring 1996, at 23;
Christopher A. Vellturo, Creatingan Effective Diversion: EvaluatingMergers with Differentiated
Products, ANTITRUST, Spring 1997, at 16 (reflecting on why mergers involving highly
differentiated products often present antitrust issues that require a cautious consideration
of "traditional (homogeneous product) Merger Guidelines analysis"); Peritz, supra note
129.
141Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. at 372.
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A newspaper reflects the biases and views of its writers, editors, and
perhaps owners. One newspaper may downplay and truncate a news wire
story, while the other newspaper may carry it as a headline. These are
not fungible commodities. Thus, the marketplace is not about consumers
switching from one homogeneous product to another. Rather, it is the
net increase in consumer welfare from having many competing news
sources and editorial voices. AsJudge Hand aptly stated about the marketplace of ideas-and it bears repeating-"it is only by cross-lights from
varying directions that full illumination can be secured.' 14 2 Unlike
restraints on ordinary commodities (where consumers may turn to lessdesirable alternatives but the overall societal impact is not significant),
for restraints in the media, the alternatives may be inherently unsatisfactory and the costs imposed on society may be significant. 4 '
3. Risks to Democracy from Concentration of Media Ownership
The increasing number of media mergers has spurred the concern
that these mergers may threaten our democracy by restricting the free
flow of information in the marketplace of ideas. The concern about
concentration of the media has several facets.
One concern, as expressed by FTC Chairman Pitofsky, is that excessive
concentration of economic power may breed antidemocratic political
pressures. 144 As the legislative histories of the Sherman and Clayton Acts
evince, one purpose of the antitrust laws is to deter the effects that
market power has on our democracy. Lawrence Sullivan agrees:
To argue, as do the Chicago economists, that antitrust ought to be used
solely to inhibit expressions of market power in a technical economic
sense, is not only to miss much in the history and development of the
law, but to ignore much of its potential... The political consensus that
supports antitrust comes from other sources. Americans continue to
value institutions the scale and the workings of which they can comprehend. Many continue to value the decentralization of decision making
power and responsibility. Many favor structures in which power in one
locus may be checked by power in another. Antitrust, broadly conceived
and sensitively
administered, may contribute to the realization of
145
these values.
Id.

142

See Associated Press, 326 U.S. at 28 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
Pitofsky, supranote 1. When asked his views on media mergers, FTC Chairman Pitofsky
recommended reading his 1979 article. See Bryan Gruley, Pitofsky Will Test Marketplace of
Ideas Theory in FTC's Review of Time Warner-TurnerDeal, WALL ST. J., Oct. 9, 1995, at A14,
available at 1995 WL 9903008.
"I Lawrence A. Sullivan, Economics and More Humanistic Disciplines: What Are the Sources
of Wisdom for Antitrust , 125 U. PA. L. Rv.1214, 1222-23 (1977). See also Eleanor M. Fox,
Antitrust, Competitiveness, and the World Arena: Efficiencies and FailingFirms in Perspective, 64
143

114
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A second related concern is that, absent vigorous antitrust scrutiny of
media mergers, more onerous regulations will likely ensue. If the free
market is allowed to develop under antitrust rules that are blind to
all but select economic values, the likely result will be an economy so
dominated by a few corporate giants that it will be impossible for the
state not to play a more intrusive role in economic affairs. 4 6 As discussed
above, Congress shared this concern when it amended and strengthened
the Clayton Act in 1950. And this concern applies equally today to the
marketplace of ideas, which is not immune from market failure. Senator
Orrin Hatch noted that with respect to the Internet, antitrust scrutiny
today may prevent more onerous regulations tomorrow:
I believe competition is critical to the future of the Internet, and to
ensure its deregulated characteristic. Competition has created the
robust Internet economy that we are experiencing today, with unprecedented investments in new software products, services and technologies.
In this regard, I believe that antitrust law-and its timely enforcement,
as established through sound legal and economic principles-can serve
as the least restrictive and most attractive alternative to government
regulation. As I have said before, proper enforcement of antitrust laws
today, will and should, avoid heavy-handed regulation of the Internet
tomorrow. "
If the government elects to ignore the marketplace of ideas, and if this
market becomes hampered by anticompetitive restraints, one simply does
not want the government later to recreate this lost competition through
behavioral regulations on media monopolies. As Judge Greene, the Justice Department, and others concluded, behavioral restrictions on AT&T
were unsuccessful in curbing that monopoly. Rather, the goal under
the Clayton Act is to prevent the creation via mergers of these media
monopolies in the first place, and not wait until the anticompetitive
practices fully manifest themselves. 48
L.J. 725, 728-29 (1996) ("the competition system is a fundamental prong of
a vision of political economy compatable with and likely to stabilize democratic institutions,
as we are reminded by the democracy/free enterprise revolutions in Central Europe.").
116Pitofsky, supra note 1, at 1051.
17Comments by Sen. Orrin Hatch, available at http://www.senate.gov/-hatch/
press172.html.
148
"Section 7 of the Clayton Act was intended to arrest the anticompetitive effects of
market power in their incipiency. The core question is whether a merger may substantially
lessen competition, and necessarily requires a prediction of the merger's impact on competition, present and future. . . . The section can deal only with probabilities, not with
certainties. ... And there is certainly no requirement that the anticompetitive power
manifest itself in anticompetitive action before § 7 can be called into play. If the enforcement of § 7 turned on the existence of actual anticompetitive practices, the congressional
policy of thwarting such practices in their incipiency would be frustrated." FTC v. Procter
& Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 577 (1967).
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A third concern is that media concentration may give rise to undesirable media self-censorship. This is one of the concerns that led to the
1992 Cable Act. Congress noted its "special concerns" about concentration of the media in the hands of a few who may control the dissemination
of information. 49 One Congressional concern is that "the media gatekeepers will (1) slant information according to their own biases, or (2)
provide no outlet for unorthodox or unpopular speech because it does
not sell well, or both." 150 Congress's second concern about "horizontal
concentration is that it can be the basis of anticompetitive acts. For
example, a market that is dominated by one buyer of a product, a
monopsonist, does not give the seller any of the benefits of competition."'' Congress sought to remedy these concerns in the 1992 Cable
Act, with several provisions including the "must-carry," 5 2 "subscriber
limits" 15 3 and "channel occupancy" provisions.

54

In upholding the latter

two provisions of the 1992 Cable Act, Judge Douglas Ginsburg wrote:
As with the must-carry obligation, [Congress's] concern was not with
what a cable operator might say, but that it might not let others say
anything at all in the principal medium for reaching much of the public.
("The First Amendment's command that government not impede the
freedom of speech does not disable the government from taking steps

to ensure that private interests not restrict, through physical control of
a critical pathway of communication, the free flow of information and
ideas"). The must-carry obligation and the subscriber limits provision
both preserve for consumers some competition in the provision of
programming. The must-carry obligation preserves competition

between broadcasters and the cable operator, while the subscriber limits
preserve competition between the cable operator and its affiliated programmers on the one hand and unaffiliated providers of cable programming on the other. By placing a value upon diversity and competition

in cable programming the Congress did not necessarily also value one
speaker, or one type of speech, over another; it merely expressed its
intention that there continue to be multiple speakers.

19 S. REP. No. 102-92, at 32-33 (1991), 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1165-66.
'50Id.
151 Id.
152 The must-carry provisions of the 1992 Cable Act require a cable system with more
than 300 subscribers and 12 channels to set aside up to one-third of its channels for local
broadcast stations that request carriage. 47 U.S.C. § 534(b) (1) (B). This provision was the
focus in the Supreme Court's decision in Turner, discussed above.
I5s The subscriber limits provision directs the FCC to limit the number of subscribers a
cable operator may reach. 47 U.S.C. § 533(f) (1) (A).
15 The channel occupancy provision directs the FCC to limit the number of channels
on a cable system that may be devoted to video programming in which the operator has
a financial interest. Id. § 533(f) (1) (B).
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Indeed, the same unique characteristic of the cable medium that justified the imposition of the must-carry obligation is also invoked by the
Government to justify the subscriber limits, namely, "the bottleneck
monopoly power exercised by cable operators." In Turner I this bottleneck power was seen to jeopardize the viability of broadcast television;
in this case, it arguably threatens diversity and competition in the provision of cable programming. 55
The D.C. Circuit concluded that Congress drew reasonable inferences,
based upon substantial evidence, that increases in the concentration of
cable operators threatened diversity and competition in the cable
156
industry.
Journalists and media watchdogs have also expressed concern about
the rise of self-censorship and the loss of journalistic independence
following the increasing media concentration. 5 7Whether self-censorship
is direct evidence of the exercise of market power in the marketplace
of ideas is a thorny issue. Self-censorship arguably is a reduction in
output. A monopolist may kill an otherwise newsworthy story when publication may negatively impact its profits. We often hear this concern with
conglomerates acquiring media outlets-as control of the media falls
into fewer hands, the greater the concern about self-censorship. In
certain instances, this may very well be direct evidence of market power.
Recall that truth prevails in a competitive marketplace of ideas. If a
market is plagued with falsities or material omissions reflecting the
media's self-interests, this may evidence market failure. But in other
cases, this self-censorship may be the legitimate activity of journalists.
Not every bit of news is published (or, in our opinion, should be). As
Justice Burger noted:
A newspaper is more than a passive receptacle or conduit for news,
comment, and advertising. The choice of material to go into a newspaper, and the decisions made as to limitations on the size and content
of the paper, and treatment of public issues and public officialswhether fair or unfair-constitute the exercise of editorial control and
judgment. It has yet to be demonstrated how governmental regulation
of this crucial process can be exercised consistent with First Amendment
58
guarantees of a free press as they have evolved to this time.
151
Time Warner Entm't v. United States, 211 F.3d 1313, 1317-18 (D.C. Cir. 2000), cert.
denied, 121 S. Ct. 1167 (2001) (citations omitted).
151
Id. at 1319-20.
117See, e.g.,
ROBERT W. MCCHESNEY, RICH MEDIA, POOR DEMOCRACY: COMMUNICATION
POLITICS IN DUBIOUS TIMES (1999); BEN H. BAGDIKIAN, THE MEDIA MONOPOLY (6th

ed. 2000); Mark Crispin Miller, Can Viacom's Reporters Cover Viacom's Interests?, COLUM.
JOURNALISM REv., Nov./Dec. 1999, at 50.
1s Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974) (footnote omitted);
see also Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972) (distinguishing prior cases, which
"involve[d] no intrusions upon speech or assembly, no prior restraint or restriction on
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Journalists routinely exercise judgment in editing news. That is part of
their craft: to highlight and emphasize certain news, while silently passing
other news. And an "elementary First Amendment proposition" is that
the "government may not force a newspaper to print copy which, in its
journalistic discretion, it chooses to leave on the newsroom floor."' 5 9
Moreover, journalists may mutually agree to redact the name of a rape
victim in their articles. It is unlikely that this coordinated practice is per
se illegal as an output reduction. Thus, drawing the line between editorial
freedom and illegal output reduction is itself difficult, and penalizing a
newspaper for not publishing a story may itself be unconstitutional under
the First Amendment.
Yet, the concern of a merger giving rise to self-censorship prompted
in part the Antitrust Division to challenge International Telephone and
Telegraph's (ITT) attempted takeover in the 1960s of the American
Broadcasting Company (ABC). ITT was described as "a sprawling international conglomerate" of 433 separate boards of directors that derived
at that time about 60 percent of its income from its significant holdings
in at least forty foreign countries. 16 ABC in 1966 was similarly large,
controlling 399 theaters in 34 states, 5 VHF television stations, 6 AM and
6 FM stations (all in the top 10 broadcasting markets), and one of the
3 major television networks and one of the 4 major radio networks in
the world. Its 137 primary television network affiliates could reach 93
percent of the then 50 million television homes in the United States,
and its radio network affiliates could reach 97 percent of the then 55
million homes with radio receivers. 161
Three FCC Commissioners raised concerns about this transaction. "As
it seemed to Commissioners Bartley and Cox and to me [Johnson] when
we dissented from the Commission's approval of the merger in June,
1967, a company whose daily activities require it to manipulate governments at the highest levels would face unending temptation to manipulate ABC news.' 62 The three dissenting FCC Commissioners concluded:
"We simply cannot find that the public interest of the American citizenry
is served by turning over a major network to an international enterprise
whose fortunes are tied to its political relations with the foreign officials
what the press may publish, and no express or implied command that the press publish
what it prefers to withhold.").
159Miami Herald, 418 U.S. at 261 (White, J., concurring).
110Nicholas Johnson, The Media Barons and the Public Interest: An FCC Commissioner's
Warning, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, June 1968, available at http://www.theatlantic.com/
unbound/flashbks/media/johnsonf.htm.

Id.

161

Id.

162
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whose actions it will be called upon to interpret to the world. ' 163 A
majority of FCC Commissioners approved the transaction. It ultimately
was the Antitrust Division that asked the U.S. Court of Appeals to enjoin
the transaction, in part to protect ABC'sjournalistic independence. After
the Justice Department brought suit, ITT abandoned the transaction.
IV. ARE THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST AGENCIES EQUIPPED
TO REVIEW THE MARKETPLACE OF IDEAS?
Some argue that the issue of a merger's impact on the marketplace
of ideas should be left to the FCC and/or Congress. This section addresses
two points. First, whether antitrust review should be left to the FCC, and
second, whether the current antitrust laws are sufficiently flexible to
include analysis of the marketplace of ideas.
A.

THE

FCC

REGULATORY SCHEME DOES NOT PREEMPT ANTITRUST
REVIEW OF THE MARKETPLACE OF IDEAS

Any claim that the marketplace of ideas is best left to the FCC ignores
Congress's intent in enacting the Telecommunications Act of 1996.164
The 1996 Act is deregulatory in its approach, continuing the shift of
the telecommunications industry away from a heavily regulated industry
(with behavioral restrictions) to open competition (with structural
restrictions). Congress's intent, as expressed by the 1996 Act, is that the
antitrust analysis should be primarily conducted by the federal antitrust
agencies and not by the FCC. While the FCC's "public interest" standard
and ownership control regulations touch upon antitrust issues, Congress
wanted the Justice Department and the FTC independently and carefully
to review media mergers and their impact on competition in the marketplace of ideas. As reflected in the legislative history of the savings clause
to the Telecommunications Act of 1996, the FCC regulatory scheme
does not preempt antitrust review of media mergers generally, and the
marketplace of ideas specifically.
1. Congressional Intent of the Telecommunications Act of 1996
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 was intended to foster competition in the marketplace of ideas. It sought "to provide for a pro-competitive, de-regulatory national policy framework designed to accelerate
rapidly private sector deployment of advanced telecommunications and
information technologies and services to all Americans by opening all
163Id.
614Pub. L. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified in scattered sections of Titles 15, 18 & 47 of
the United States Code (West Supp. 1997)).
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telecommunications markets to competition."' 165 One can regulate
monopolies with command-and-control behavioral-type regulations.
Another mechanism is to eliminate regulatory entry barriers, and rely
on the antitrust laws. The theme underlying the 1996 Telecommunications Act was to open the telecommunications industry to competition,
rather than have the FCC continue to regulate the behavior of incumbent
monopolies. Opening the industry to competition was viewed as a means
of promoting competition in the marketplace of ideas.'66
Even before the 1996 Telecommunications Act, Congress believed that
regulation was a poor surrogate for competition. As Senator Howard
Metzenbaum and others voiced, the "federal and state regulation of the
telecommunications industry has been and will continue to be a poor
substitute for aggressive antitrust review." 167 While attempting to "approximate the results of vigorous competition," regulations can be readily
circumvented. 68 Likewise, Judge Bazelon, speaking only for himself,
stated in 1980 that:
[T]he way to avoid the Hobson's choice inevitable in the present regulatory scheme is to move away from "behavioral" regulation toward what
might be called "structural" regulation of the media. The former
approach scrutinizes the conduct of the licensee, as the FCC does today.
The latter approach would employ antitrust concepts, limitations on
cross-ownership, and the like to insure diversity in broadcasting
while
16
minimizing government attention to broadcast content.
So Congress focused in the 1996 Telecommunications Act on applying
the antitrust laws to ensure competition-rather than relying on post
hoc regulations by the FCC. One risk in deregulating the telecommunications industry could be an increase in anticompetitive practices. Consequently, Congress entrusted the federal antitrust authorities with the task
of ensuring competition in the marketplace of ideas. As Congressman
Conyers stated:
165 Telecommunications Act of 1996, S. REP. No. 104-230 (1996), available at 1996 WL
54191, at *1.
1 As Rep. Gilchrest stated, "with the advent of the information age, we need to recognize
the need for competition among information media so that the free marketplace of ideas
can be communicated through a free marketplace of information outlets. This bill seeks to
exploit the market's ability to maximize quality, maximize consumer choice, and minimize
prices." 142 CONG. REc. H1175.
167 Consolidation in TelecommunicationsIndustry-SenatorMetzenbaum's Views, 7 Trade Reg.
Rep. (CCH) T 50,126.

168Id.

169Leflore Broad. Co. v. FCC, 636 F.2d 454, 458 n.26 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (citing Bazelon,
The FirstAmendment and the "New Media" New Directions in Regulating Telecommunications, 31
FED. COMMUN. L.J. 212-13 (1979)).
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[T] he antitrust laws and the Antitrust Division must remain at the very
center of the telecommunications debate. Antitrust law is synonymous
with low prices and consumer protection-and that is exactly what we
need in our telecommunications industry. The Antitrust Division is the
principal government agency responsible for antitrust enforcement. Its
role in the MFJ has given it decades of expertise in telecommunications
competition issues. The Division has unrivaled expertise in making
predictive judgments and in assessing marketplace effects. The FCC
by contrast has no antitrust
background, and is facing the threat of
70
significant downsizing.

The applicability of the antitrust laws to the marketplace of ideas is
reinforced in the legislative history of the 1996 Telecommunications
Act's antitrust savings clause, which states that the Act does not "modify,
impair, or supersede the applicability of any antitrust laws." 7 Thus, the
1996 Telecommunications Act, under the clear terms of this savings
172
clause, does not preempt the antitrust statutes.

Moreover, Congress in 1996 eliminated the last antitrust safe-haven
by repealing Section 221 (a) of the Communications Act.1 73 Before 1996,
174
the Communications Act of 1934 had a general antitrust savings clause,
with one exception. This exception precluded antitrust review of telephone mergers. This section provided that when any two telephone
companies merge, the FCC should determine whether the merger will
be "of advantage to the persons to whom service is to be rendered and
in the public interest.' 1 75 If so, the FCC could render the transaction
immune from "any Act or Acts of Congress making the proposed transaction unlawful." 176 Congress enacted section 221 (a) "in the days when
local telephone service was viewed as a natural monopoly." 177 And as
171
142 CONG. REC. H1145 (statement of Rep. Conyers).
171
Section 601(b) (1) of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, reprinted in 47 U.S.C.

§ 152, Historical and Statutory Notes.
172The continued importance of the antitrust laws in the media industry was also mentioned by President Clinton in signing the 1996 Act: "This clause ensures that even for
activities allowed under or required by the legislation, or activities resulting from FCC
rulemakings or orders, the antitrust laws continue to apply fully." President Clinton's
Remarks on Signing The Telecommunications Act of 1996, Feb. 8, 1996, at 13. Likewise,
Rep. Conyers described the antitrust savings clause as "all-important" since it ensures that
"any and all telecommunications merger and anticompetitive activities are fully subject to
the antitrust laws. Telco-cable mergers and all other broadcast, media, or telecommunications transactions will be fu'lly subject to antitrust review, regardless of how they are treated
tinder the bill or the FCC." 142 CONG. REc. H1171 (statement of Rep. Conyers).
17347 U.S.C. § 221 (a) (repealed by Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-104,
Title VI, § 601 (b) (2), Feb. 8, 1996, 110 Stat. 143).
174
47 U.S.C. § 313(a).
175
47 U.S.C. § 221(a) (repealed 1996).
176
Id.
177S. RP. No. 104-230 (1996), availableat 1996 WL 54191, at *450.
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Congress noted, "[i]n a world of regulated monopolies, this idea made
sense."1 78 But the 1996 Telecommunications Act sought to foster competition in the deregulated local telephone service. Because this exemption
from antitrust scrutiny was contrary to this goal, Congress repealed this
exemption in the 1996 Telecommunications Act. As the Senate Report
to the 1996 Telecommunications Act states,
By returning review of mergers in a competitive industry to the DOJ,
this repeal would be consistent with one of the underlying themes of
the bill-to get both agencies back to their proper roles and to end
government by consent decree. The Commission should be carrying
out the policies of the Communications Act, and the DOJ should be
carrying out the policies of the antitrust laws. The repeal would not
affect the Commission's ability to conduct any review of a merger for
Communications Act purposes, e.g. transfer of licenses. Rather, it would
79
simply end the Commission's ability to confer antitrust immunity.
Clearly, the shift has been away from regulation to open competition.
Accompanying this shift is the deemphasis of FCC regulations and the
increasing role of antitrust scrutiny. Thus, mergers that may substantially
lessen competition in the marketplace of ideas should fall squarely on
the Department of Justice and the FTC. FCC Chairman Michael Powell
has recently stated that he would like to see the FCC do less competition
analysis, believing that such analysis is better left to the antitrust
agencies."s
2. FCC's Public Interest and Common Ownership Standards
Do Not Preempt Antitrust Analysis
Just as the FCC statutes do not expressly preempt antitrust regulation,
so too the FCC's "public interest" standard and restrictions on common
ownership do not adequately address a media merger's impact on the
marketplace of ideas.
In issuing licenses to broadcasters, the FCC must determine under
the public interest standard if the "public convenience, interest, or neces178Id.

179
Id. at *442.
181
FCC: Chairman Leery of Antitrust Duties, Cm.TRIB., Mar. 29, 2001, at 2, available at
2001 WL 4056462. Commissioner Powell also noted that the FCC lacks the antitrust
expertise. See Opening Statement of Michael K. Powell, FCC Commissioner, Before the
Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Trade and Consumer Protection of the House
Committee on Commerce, Mar. 17, 1999. Moreover, this has been the FCC's position
since at least the 1940s. See Nat'l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 223-24 (1943)
(quoting 1941 FCC report that it is not FCC's function to apply the antitrust laws to
questionable network practices); United States v. Radio Corp. of Am., 358 U.S. 334, 350
n.18 (1959).
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sity will be served thereby."'' This public interest standard arises because
the media neither owns the airwaves nor has an absolute right to broadcast over the airwaves. 182 The airwaves belong to the people, so broadcasters receive only a license under 47 U.S.C. § 307(a). The FCC's public
interest standard was drafted broadly as "a supple instrument to effect
congressional desires 'to maintain * * * a grip on the dynamic aspects of
radio transmission' and to allay fears that 'in the absence of governmental
control the public interest might be subordinated to monopolistic domination in the broadcasting field." 183 As the Supreme Court has recognized, the values underlying the First Amendment principle of diversity
in dissemination of information to the American public coincide with
the policies of the antitrust laws. 84 So while the FCC "does not have
power to enforce the antitrust laws as such, it is permitted to take antitrust
policies into account in making licensing decisions pursuant to the public-interest standard.' ' 8 5 As the Court noted, "in a given case the Commission might find that antitrust considerations alone would keep the
statutory standard from being met, as when the publisher of the sole
newspaper in an area applies for a license for the only available radio
and television facilities, which, if granted, would give him a monopoly
of that area's major media of mass communication."'8 8
The public interest standard is a flexible one that encompasses the
"broad aims of the Communications Act." 8 7 Among these broad aims
is to realize the desire of Congress to implement a "pro-competitive, deregulatory national policy framework designed to... open [ ]all telecommunications markets to competition ....
While the public interest standard addresses in part certain antitrust
goals, this FCC standard does not preempt the antitrust laws. First, as
discussed above, the FCC's regulations generally, and the public interest
standard in particular, do not preempt the antitrust laws. Rather, the
public interest standard addresses a broader goal, which has in part
181
47 U.S.C. § 307(a).
182Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 394 (1969) ("Licenses to broadcast do
not confer ownership of designated frequencies, but only the temporary privilege of using
them.") (citing 47 U.S.C. § 301).
183Id. at 394-95 (quoting FCC v. Pottsville Broad. Co., 309 U.S. 134, 137-38 (1940)).
184
See FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for Broad., 436 U.S. 775, 800 n.18 (1978).
"I Id. at 795.

186United States v. Radio Corp. of Am., 358 U.S. 334, 351-52 (1959).
187
Application of WorldCom, Inc. and MCI Communications Corp. for Transfer of
Control of MCI Communications Corp. to WorldCom, Inc., Memorandum Opinion and
Order, FCC 98-225 9 (1998).
188Id.
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antitrust underpinnings.189 Second, as Congressman Hyde noted in the
legislative debates on the 1996 Telecommunications Act, "[a] public
interest review by the FCC simply is not a strong enough tool to prevent
these giants from destroying competition and recreating a monopoly
system through a series of megamergers." 19 By returning the review of
telecommunications mergers in a competitive industry to the DOJ, the
1996 Telecommunications Act "is consistent with one of the underlying
themes of the bill-to get both agencies back to their proper roles and
to end Government by consent decree."' 9'1 The FCC would carry out the
policies of the Communications Act, and "the DOJ should be carrying
1 92
out the policies of the antitrust laws."
For the same reasons, the FCC's restrictions on common ownership
do not preempt the antitrust laws. Over the years, the FCC has imposed
ownership limits within and across different media. In broadcasting, for
example, it has adopted rules limiting the number of outlets that a single
entity can own in a local market and nationally. The Commission justified
these rules as principally designed to prevent concentration, enhance
competition, and promote diversity of voices.' 93
These structural ownership restrictions were loosened under the 1996
Telecommunications Act. There are no restrictions on the number of
television or radio stations that any one entity can own nationwide.
Nationally, a single owner can own television stations that reach up to
35 percent of television households. Locally, a single owner can own as
many as eight radio stations in a metropolitan area (the caps work on
a graduated basis). 19 4 Also, the 1996 Act permitted greater common
189See National Citizens, 436 U.S. at 795-96 (noting that the Commission may properly
consider antitrust issues and collecting cases); Radio Corp. of Am., 358 U.S. at 351-52
(observing that in certain cases the Commission may find that antitrust considerations
alone would prevent the public interest standard from being satisfied); FCC v. RCA Comm.,
Inc., 346 U.S. 86, 94 (1953) (noting that "[t]here can be no doubt that competition is a
relevant factor in weighing the public interest"); Nat'l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319
U.S. 190, 222-23 (1943) (holding that the Commission may consider the effect of a
broadcast license applicant's anticompetitive conduct on the public interest).
In Radio Corp. of America, 358 U.S. at 346, Chief Justice Warren held that FCC approval
of a media transaction under its public interest standard does not bar the antitrust agencies
from attacking the transaction under the antitrust laws. The legislative history of the
Communications Act of 1934 revealed that the FCC was "not given the power to decide
antitrust issues as such, and that Commission action was not intended to prevent enforcement of the antitrust laws in federal courts." Id.
10142 CONG. Rac. H1158 (statement of Rep. Hyde).
191Id.

192
Id.
193
Lili Levi, Reflections on the FCC's Recent Approach to StructuralRegulation of the Electronic
Mass Media, 52 FED. COMM. L.J. 581, 582-84 (2000).
19447

C.F.R. § 73.3555(a) (1).
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ownership of different media outlets-for example, a single owner can
own both a broadcast television network and a cable system-and the
ban on the ownership of television stations and cable systems in the
same local market was eliminated.
But these ownership restrictions are not intended to foreclose antitrust
scrutiny. In certain instances, the FCC in construing ownership regulations may reach contradictory results, as in FCCv. NationalCitizens Committee for Broadcasting.191 The regulations prospectively barred formation or
transfer of newspaper-broadcast combinations in the same market, and
also provided for divestiture of existing combinations with the possibility
of waivers. The FCC ordered divestiture only in sixteen egregious cases.
Most of these were in smaller markets where the Commission found that
the newspaper-broadcast combinations had an "effective monopoly" in
the "local marketplace of ideas as well as economically."' 196 The Supreme
Court concluded that "it was hardly unreasonable for the Commission
to confine divestiture to communities in which there is common ownership of the only daily newspaper and either the only television station
or the only broadcast station of any kind encompassing the entire community with a clear signal."' 19 7 The Court noted that the FCC's studies
had shown that newspapers and television were the two most widely
98
utilized media sources for local news and discussion of public affairs.
But the FCC permitted such media combinations in other cities for noneconomic reasons. The Antitrust Division contended that the FCC's
regulations did not go far enough and that the FCC had inadequately
justified its decision not to order divestiture on a more widespread and
consistent basis.' 99
Consequently, FCC regulations do not preempt antitrust analysis. A
telecommunications merger may violate the Clayton Act even though it
satisfies the FCC's public interest standard and ownership restrictions.
In essence, one does not necessarily follow from the other.9 0 Moreover,
Congress clearly intended that the Justice Department and the FFC
review media mergers under the antitrust laws. These federal antitrust
agencies must conduct their own independent analysis under the anti195
436 U.S. 775 (1978).

787.
Id. at 814-15.
198
Id. at 815.
Id. at
196
17

"I Id. at 789. (The United States, represented by the Antitrust Division, had been made
2344 & 2348.)
a respondent pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
200 See, e.g., Radio Corp. of Am., 358 U.S. at 350 n.18 (stating that while the FCC may deny
applications under its public interest standard where antitrust violations exist, "its approval
of transactions which might involve Sherman Act violations is not a determination that
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trust laws of whether the transaction may substantially lessen competition
in the marketplace of ideas. This is consistent not only with the legislative
history of the antitrust laws, but with the 1996 Telecommunications Act
Antitrust Division at the center
as well-in having the antitrust laws20and
1
of the telecommunications debate.
B.

REINTERPRETING EXISTING LAW OR

Is

NEW LEGISLATION NECESSARY?

After the CBS/Viacom deal was announced, Senator Paul Wellstone
suggested that Congress may need to consider a new legislative framework
to address the growing problem of media consolidation. 2 2 While additional legislation specifically aimed at media mergers has several benefits,
such legislation is not required. The current antitrust laws are sufficiently
flexible to allow federal antitrust agency review of the marketplace of
ideas.
One benefit of additional legislation is that courts grant "substantial"
deference to Congress for legislation that is "intended to forestall the
abuse of monopoly power." 203 To uphold a content-neutral statute, the
Court will inquire under an "intermediate scrutiny" standard whether:
(1) the legislative conclusion was reasonable and supported by substantial
evidence in the record before Congress; (2) the act furthers an important
or substantial interest unrelated to the suppression of free speech; and
(3) the legislation burdens speech no more than is essential to the
furtherance of that interest. 204 This is a much easier standard than that
of a plaintiff in a typical antitrust case.
A second benefit of new legislation is that it may avoid the problem,
identified by the majority in Turner II, of a "considerable expense and
delay inherent in antitrust litigation, and the great disparities in wealth
and sophistication between the average independent broadcast station
and average cable system operator," that can make the antitrust remedies
inadequate. 205 Many independent broadcasters "simply are not in a position to engage in complex antitrust litigation, which involves extensive
the Sherman Act has not been violated, and therefore cannot forestall the United States
from subsequently challenging those transactions.").
201 142 CONG. Rc. H1172 (statement of Rep. Conyers).
2 See Remarks of Senator Paul Wellstone on the Acquisition of CBS by Viacom Before the
Senate Judiciary Committee Subcommittee on Antitrust, Business Rights, and Competition
(Oct. 28, 1999), available at http://www.senate.gov/-wellstone/On-the-Record/FloorStatements/FloorStatements-1999/cbsmerger2.htm.
201Turner II, 520 U.S. at 225 (Stevens, J., concurring).
204Id. at 189.
205Id. at 222-23.
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practice, appeals, and the payment of high
discovery, significant motions
6
legal fees throughout."

20

A third benefit is that new legislation may avoid the courts "assess [ing]
competing economic theories and predictive judgments, as we would in
"20
a case arising, say, under the [existing] antitrust laws. 1
We do not oppose statutory reform of the antitrust laws. But the
current antitrust statutes-by express design-are sufficiently flexible.
In fact, Judge Learned Hand stated more than fifty years ago that the
antitrust statutes are a "legislative warrant" as "Congress has incorporated
into the Anti-Trust Acts the changing standards of the common law, and
by so doing has delegated to the courts the duty of fixing the standard
for each case. ' 20 8 As evidenced in the 1996 Telecommunications Act,
Congress adopted this view in entrusting to the federal antitrust agencies
the task of reviewing mergers in the telecommunications industry with
the current antitrust laws.20 9 One benefit that the current antitrust laws

have over an industry-specific regulation is this flexibility. Today's antitrust laws can keep abreast of changes in the industry (more so perhaps
than antitrust laws that are tailored to the industry as it exists today).
V. RESOLUTION AND ONE SUGGESTED APPROACH,
Given the importance of the marketplace of ideas to our democracy,
the fear of governmental interference should not deter the antitrust
206Id.

at 223.

207Id.

at 207-08.

Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. at 370.
210 If new legislation is considered for the media industry, a survey by Oxford University,
available at http://www.medialaw.ru/e-pages/laws/ero-union/e-conc.htm, on the European principles of media ownership regulation and. transparency may be, of interest. The
purpose of this survey was to assist a working group of Russian media law experts in the
drafting of a policy recommendation on media ownership. The survey outlines 12 key policy
instruments used to control media market concentration and those effecting ownership in
media markets in Europe: (1) General competition law and specific provisions under
competition law directed towards the media; (2) regulating media and telecommunications
operators through licensing of national services; (3) requiring the promotion of media
pluralism as a pre-requisite to license-issuing; (4) lowering entry barriers to markets through
legal decisions and economic incentives (tax relief, financial assistance); (5) promoting
media which are seen to provide diversity of content or represent minority views; (6)
providing financial assistance to content providers providing a variety of content; (7)
guaranteeing the high quality and availability of public service broadcasting (by instituting
"must-carry" rules on cable, satellite and digital providers); (8) adopting legal instruments
to safeguard editorial independence and freedom of expression; (9) requiring high transparency of company reports and activities; (10) monitoring ownership patterns in media
markets and making this information publicly available; (11) ensuring open networks
and universal service for Internet users; and (12) preventing gateway monopolies of
new services.
208
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agencies from evaluating a merger's impact on the marketplace of ideas.
The focus of the debate-as in Associated Press and Turner-should be
on how to take this marketplace into account.
This article does not attempt to outline all the factors or issues, or
suggest a bright-line standard of illegality under the Clayton Act. This
may be inappropriate, given the fact-intensive inquiry for each merger,
and the evolving nature of the industry. Instead, we propose three modest
points in reviewing media mergers under the antitrust laws.
The first proposal is that the antitrust agencies should look beyond
price effects generally, and advertising prices specifically, in media mergers and consider other nonprice dimensions of economic competition,
such as diminished quality and choice. Second, efficiencies need to be
viewed against the backdrop of the marketplace of ideas. Third, direct
evidence of anticompetitive effects should be given significant weight
by the agencies and the courts.
A. LOOKING BEYOND PRICE EFFECTS-THE MARKETPLACE OF IDEAS
As A FORM OF NONPRICE COMPETITION

The antitrust laws should apply to competition in the marketplace of
ideas, which is a form of nonprice competition. Given the very nature
of media as a marketplace of information, a diversity of news options
may be more important to consumers than ordinary price competition.
One does not directly pay for broadcast television. Rather, the broadcasters compete for the viewer's attention with diverse and varied programming. This benefits the viewer with better broadcasting and the
broadcaster with higher advertising rates.
If the broadcast networks were to combine their news operations, but
each independently set its own advertising rates, the merger might not
be challenged if the marketplace of ideas were excluded from the analysis. Even though the evening news would remain free, and the ad rates
would remain competitive, the nonprice competition among the news
networks would be eliminated. This is because the loss of this editorial
diversity could not be readily replaced. As the district court found in
Gannett,
no monetary amount will be able to compensate for the loss of the

[daily local newspaper's] editorial and reportorial voice, the elimination
of a significant forum for the airing of ideas and thoughts, the elimination of an important source of democratic expression, and the removal
of a significant facet by which news is disseminated in the community. 10
210 Hawaii v. Gannett Pac. Corp., 99 F. Supp.2d 1241, 1253-54 (D. Haw.), affd, 203 F.3d
832 (9th Cir. 1999).
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Thus, we propose that such nonprice competition in the marketplace
of ideas be considered in evaluating media mergers.
B.

DIFFERENT ROLE OF EFFICIENCIES-TENSION BETWEEN

ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY (AND HOMOGENIZATION)

AND THE

SOCIAL GOAL OF FRAGMENTED MARKETPLACE OF IDEAS

Our second proposal is that efficiencies need to be reconciled with
certain natural inefficiencies in the marketplace of ideas. We do not
propose that one must quantify the loss of diversity in a media merger
and then compare this loss to the merger's increased efficiencies. This
loss of competition in the marketplace of ideas-while real-might not
be readily quantifiable. And even if one could compare the two in dollar
terms, it may not be that meaningful.
Efficiencies are not always dispositive when a higher ideal, such as
diversity, is prized. Many independent news sources may confer a greater
benefit to society than a highly efficient monopolist that produces a
homogenous news product. As FTC Chairman Pitofsky noted, "an occasional loss of efficiency as a result of antitrust enforcement can be
tolerated and is to be expected if antitrust is to serve other legitimate
values. '1211Chief Justice Warren also observed in the Clayton Act's legislative history that a certain amount of inefficiency was the price paid for
decentralized market power:
[W] e cannot fail to recognize Congress' desire to promote competition
through the protection of viable, small, locally owned businesses. Congress appreciated that occasional higher costs and prices might result
from the maintenance of fragmented industries and markets. It21 resolved
2
these competing considerations in favor of decentralization.
So too, an inefficient democracy may be valued more than an efficient
authoritarian state: "[t]he wastes of democracy are among the greatest
obvious wastes, but we have compensations in democracy which far out' 213
weigh that waste and make it more efficient than absolutism.
The inherent inefficiency of the marketplace of ideas sets it apart from
mergers of ordinary commodities, which may enable firms to achieve
2'1Pitofsky, supra note 1, at 1074.
212Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 344 (1962); see also Wesley A. Cann,
Jr., Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the Pursuit of Economic 'Objectivity': Is There Any Role for
Social and Political Values in Merger Policy?, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 273, 299-300 (1985)
(citing cases where courts have recognized that competition and resulting efficiencies give
way to other social values).
213 Louis BRANDEIS, THE CURSE OF BIGNESS 105 (1934)

(quoted in United States v.

Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 534-35 n.1 (1948) (Douglas, J., dissenting)).
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economies of scale. "Indeed, the primary benefit of mergers to the
economy is their potential to generate such efficiencies. 214 In industries
with high fixed costs and homogeneous products, a merger may enable
the parties to rationalize production lines-whereby the machines are
running for longer time periods, with greater output. Consumers in
these industries may not desire product variety, and this loss of diversity
is insignificant.
Indeed, an analysis concerned with efficiencies may point in the wrong
direction. It might be very efficient if all the newspapers combined their
news collection operations into one operation. News collection generally
has high fixed costs. To report a story may cost the same if you have
one reader or a million readers. This cost is reduced with each additional
newspaper that is sold or read. Under one operation, the newspapers
could eliminate their back offices, duplicate news bureaus, etc. The joint
venture could better utilize its scarce resources, and achieve significant
cost savings unattainable outside the venture. This joint venture may
produce a lower-cost newspaper, with a lower newsstand price-so
instead of paying fifty cents, one may pay a quarter for the newspaper.
But in the marketplace of ideas, a premium is placed on diversity of
ideas. While the newspaper venture may be more efficient, the marketplace of ideas would be diminished. AsJudge Easterbrook observed, "[a]
market in which every newspaper carried the same stories, columns, and
cartoons would be a less vigorous market than the existing one. '215 So,
while consumers are paying less, they may be getting less as well. This
would raise the interesting scenario where the negative impact on quality
(nonprice competition) would outweigh a readily quantifiable efficiency
(newspaper readers saving, say, a quarter per day).
Consequently, when efficiencies are claimed in media mergers, one
should recognize the tension between the efficiencies that arise from
the homogenization and uniformity of products, on the one hand, and
the desire for diversity in the marketplace of ideas. We as a society may
value a certain degree of inefficiency for a greater value-such as a
diverse marketplace of ideas.
C.

BACK TO BASICS: DIRECT EVIDENCE OF ACTUAL OR LIKELY
RESTRAINTS IN THE MARKETPLACE OF IDEAS

Our third proposal is the following: when direct evidence establishes
that a combination has substantially lessened or will inevitably produce
Horizontal Merger Guidelines, supra note 4, § 4.
Paddock Publ'ns, Inc. v. Chicago Trib. Co., 103 F.3d 42, 45 (7th Cir. 1996).

214See
215
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actual restraints on news dissemination in the future, the combination
should be enjoined under the antitrust laws. This should be the case
even where market definition would be problematic.
In everyday life, one can get entangled in routines. One no longer
knows the purpose of the routine. Rather, the routine is shifted on the
shoulders of the new generation, with the admonition: follow it as it has
been followed. So, too, courts and antitrust authorities can develop the
routine of defining markets and measuring market shares and lose sight
of the bigger picture.
Why does one define markets and measure shares in the first place?
This exercise provides circumstantial evidence of market power. But if
one has direct evidence of market power, does one still need to backtrack
and fashion relevant markets and market shares? The Supreme Court
and lower courts have said no:
Since the purpose of the inquiry ihto market definition and market
power is to determine whether an arrangement has the potential for
genuine adverse effects on competition, proof of actual detrimental
effects, such as a reduction of output, can obviate the need for an inquiry
216
into market power, which is but a surrogate for detrimental effects.
Market share is just one pathway to estimating market power, which
is the ultimate consideration. "When there are better ways to estimate
market power, the court should use them."2 7 A plaintiff then has two
paths: it can show market power by either direct evidence or circumstantial evidence. The latter is traditionally shown by defining markets, measuring market share, etc. Because the "purpose of the market definition
and market power inquiry is to determine whether an arrangement has
the potential for genuine adverse effects on competition," "[p]roof of
actual detrimental effects can obviate the need for the inquiry into
'2 8
market power.
Plaintiffs should prevail if direct evidence of market power exists. At
a minimum, then, the approach by dissentingJustice Murphy in Associated
216 FTC v. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 460-61 (1986) (internal quotations
and citations omitted); see also Toys "R" Us, Inc. v. FTC, 221 F.3d 928, 937 (7th Cir. 2000);
Competitor Collaboration Guidelines, supra note 134, § 3.3 ("[W]here the likelihood of
anticompetitive harm is evident from the nature of the agreement, or anticompetitive
harm has resulted from an agreement already in operation, then, absent overriding benefits
that could offset the anticompetitive harm, the Agencies challenge such agreements without a detailed market analysis.") (footnotes omitted).
217Ball Mem'l Hosp. v. Mutual Hosp. Ins., 784 F.2d 1325, 1336 (7th Cir. 1986).
2I8 Great W. Directories, Inc. v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 63 F.3d 1378, 1384 (5th Cir.
1995), amended, 74 F.3d 613 (5th Cir. 1996); see also Coastal Fuels of P.R., Inc. v. Caribbean
Petroleum Corp., 79 F.3d 182 (1st Cir. 1996).
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Pressshould be a step forward in today's antitrust climate. Namely, before
the "Government is entitled to enjoin a combination or conspiracy
alleged to be in restraint of news, dissemination it must be shown by
competent evidence that such combination or conspiracy has in fact
resulted in restraints or will inevitably produce actual restraints in the
future." 219 Such direct evidence of restraints in the past, or that the
combination will inevitably produce actual restraints in the future, should
be probative.
The next issue is what types of direct evidence would suffice for such
antitrust review. One category is the transmission/content arena, when
a company that dominates the transmission of information seeks to enter
the content side. This was the situation in the AT&Tcase. And it also may
arise in a merger between a major cable operator and movie studio (the
anticompetitive effects of which prompted in part the 1992 Cable Act).
Congress found, in enacting the 1992 Cable Act, that a cable operator
has an incentive to favor its affiliated programmers. But a cable operator
also has an incentive to offer an attractive package of programs to its
subscribers. When these two incentives are in conflict, "the operator
may, as a rational profit-maximizer, compromise the consumers' inter221
ests." 220 But while this evidence and "a bit of economic common sense"
may suffice for Congress, the courts may likely demand more from the
antitrust agencies.
This scenario also arose in a consent decree involving Time Warner's
acquisition of Turner Broadcasting System. 222 The FTC believed that its
enforcement action was wholly consistent with the goals of Congress in
enacting the 1992 Cable Act in providing greater access to programming
and promoting competition in local cable markets. 221One of the consent
decree provisions required Time Warner to place a rival to its newly
acquired CNN on certain of its cable systems. The FTC responded that
this narrowly drawn provision was designed to restore the incentives
Time Warner would otherwise have had to carry rivals to CNN but
for the fact of this acquisition. The FTC believed that Time Warner's
acquisition of CNN, as alleged in the complaint, gave it both the ability
219Associated Press, 326 U.S. at 52-53 (Murphy, J., dissenting).

2°Time Warner Entm't v. United States, 211 F.3d 1313, 1322 (D.C. Cir. 2000), cert.
denied, 121 S. Ct. 1167 (2001).
221 Id.

MTime Warner Inc., Turner Broad. Sys., Inc., Tele-Communications, Inc., and Liberty
Media Corp., Dkt. No. C-3709 (Feb. 3, 1997).
22 Statement of Chairman Pitofsky, and Commissioners Steiger and Varney in Time
Warner Inc., Turner Broad. Sys. Inc., Tele-Communications, Inc., and Liberty Media
Corp., Dkt. No. C-3709 (Feb. 3, 1997).

ANTITRUST LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 69

and incentive to make entry of competing news services more difficult,
by denying them access to its extensive distribution system. 224 A similar
concern arose in the AOL/Time Warner merger, prompting restrictions
against AOL Time Warner from discriminating on the basis of corporate
affiliation in the transmission of content. 5
Finally, it is worth repeating that direct evidence is only one avenue.
It is not the exclusive avenue. Often in merger cases no such direct
evidence will exist. That necessitates the route through circumstantial
evidence-by defining markets, etc. The Horizontal Merger Guidelines
approach may be uninformative in defining a relevant market in the
marketplace of ideas. Public choice theory may be one avenue-where
the merger eliminates an important source of content in the marketplace
of ideas. Another avenue, as the courts have done previously in this
context, is to view the marketplace of ideas broadly by, for example,
measuring the defendants' reach (as measured by the percentage of the
populace they reach). Small increases in concentration would be subject
to scrutiny. Cases like PhiladelphiaNational Bank226 may still have force
where the product involves the marketplace of ideas and not ordinary
wares like peanuts or potatoes.
More needs to be done in this arena, as media mergers continue. The
purpose of this article is to propose that the marketplace of ideas belongs
in the antitrust analysis of media mergers. Ultimately, it will be left to
the ingenuity of lawyers and economists to refine the standards applicable
to the uniqueness of the marketplace of ideas.

224Letter to Brian P. Lamb, C-SPAN, from FTC Secretary Donald S. Clark, in response
to Lamb's comment about the FTC's consent decree regarding the acquisition of Turner
Broadcasting System, Inc. by Time Warner Inc., and Tele-Communications, Inc.'s and
Liberty Media Corporation's Proposed Acquisitions of Interests in Time Warner, Dkt. No.
C-3709 (Feb. 3,1997). The FTC observed that courts have upheld against First Amendment
challenge regulations specifically designed to address competitive concerns arising from
vertically-integrated cable companies' monopoly control over distribution. What is also
interesting is that the FTC abstained from determining which rival to CNN must be carried
on the cable network. As the FTC noted, "In this case, there is even greater reason to
avoid a more intrusive role, since programming content would be unavoidably implicatedthe selection of one competitor over another inevitably determines to some degree the
content of the new entry. In addition, excessive involvement in the selection process could
conflict with the goal that the antitrust laws, and antitrust remedies, are intended to
protect competition, not competitors." Statement of Chairman Pitofsky, and Commissioners Steiger and Varney in Time Warner Inc., Turner Broad. Sys. Inc., Tele-Communications,
Inc., and Liberty Media Corp., Dkt. No. C-3709 (Feb. 3, 1997).
225 See Analysis of Proposed Consent Order to Aid Public Comment, America Online, Inc.,
and Time Warner Inc., Dkt. No. C-3989, available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/12/
aolanalysis.pdf.
226 United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963).

